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ISRAEL'S INVASION OF GAZA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
GEORGE E. BISHARAT* WITH
TIMOTHY CRAWLEY, SARA ELTURK, CAREY JAMES, ROSE MISHAAN, AKILA
RADHAKRISHNAN, AND ANNA SANDERS*
1. INTRODUCTION
Israel commenced an aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip on December 27,
2008 in a military operation it dubbed "Operation Cast Lead."' Israel augmented
its attack with a ground invasion beginning on January 3, 2009.2 Israel initially
claimed that the assault was necessary to halt rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into
Southern Israel and was, therefore, an exercise of Israel's sovereign right of self-
defense.3 Israeli leaders apparently also sought to re-establish Israel's "deterrent
capacity," believed to have been diminished during the 2006 war on Lebanon.4
Operation Cast Lead followed the breakdown of a truce that, from June 2008 to
early November of that same year, had brought substantial calm to the border areas
of Southern Israel and Gaza.'
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1. Samuel Sockol, Israeli Warplanes Pound Gaza; Hundreds Killed in Reprisal Airstrikes
Targeting Hamas Security Facilities, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 28, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.conwp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/27/AR2008122700324.html; Nidal al-
Mughrabi, Israel Kills Scores in Air Strikes, REUTERS, Dec. 27, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/
topNews/idUSLR1342320081227?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.
2. Isabel Kershner & Taghreed el-Khodary, Israeli Troops Launch Attack on Gaza, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/world/middleeast/04mideast.html.
3. On the morning of the attack, Israel's U.N. ambassador, Gabriela Shalev, sent identical letters
to the U.N. Secretary General and the President of the Security Council stating:
I am writing this urgent letter in order to inform you that after a long period of
utmost restraint, the Government of Israel has decided to exercise, as of this
morning, its right to self-defence. Israel is taking the necessary military action in
order to protect its citizens from the ongoing terrorist attacks originating from the
Gaza Strip and carried out by Hamas and other terrorist organizations.
Security Council, Identical Letters Dated 27 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/816 (Dec. 27, 2008), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/%/o7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%o7D/Gaza%/o20S2008816.pdf.
4. Ethan Bronner, Israel Reminds Foes that It Has Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, December 28, 2008, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/world/middleeast/29assess.html.
5. See details of the truce infra Section III.
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Israel's self-defense claim was soon challenged.6 Evidence surfaced in the
Israeli press that Israel had been planning the operation for at least six months,
casting doubt on the claim that the attack was primarily a response to the
breakdown of the truce.7 Indeed, it appeared that Israel had exploited the truce
period to gather intelligence regarding potential targets in the attack. During the
same period Israel had reportedly crafted a public relations campaign to defend its
planned operation, to which new military spokespeople were assigned.9 A number
were women officers-apparently selected "to project a feminine and softer image"
to Western media audiences.10
Allegations also arose that, regardless of Israel's justification for initiating the
attack, the conduct of its military in the operation violated international law in a
number of respects. Rapidly mounting casualties among Palestinian civilians raised
concerns that Israeli troops were failing to discriminate between military and
civilian targets, or were using disproportionate force." Reports also suggested that
Israeli troops had used white phosphorous shells in densely populated parts of
Gaza, leading to deaths and terrible wounds among Palestinian civilians. 12
On January 8, 2009, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
calling for an immediate halt to fire from both Israel and Hamas.13 Nonetheless, the
assault continued until January 18, when Israel and Hamas1 4 each instituted
unilateral ceasefires, finally ending active hostilities."
6. See, e.g. Israel's Bombardment of Gaza Is Not Self-defense - It's a War Crime, THE SUNDAY
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at 20, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article
5488380.ece (letter signed by twenty-nine international lawyers and legal academics).
7. Barak Ravid, Disinformation, Secrecy, and Lies: How the Gaza Offensive Came About,
HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050426.html (last visited Sept, 26, 2009) [hereinafter
Ravid].
8. See id.
9. Anshel Pfeffer, Israel Claims Success in the PR War, THE JEWISH CHRONICLE, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.thejc.com/articles/israel-claims-success-pr-war.
10. Id; see also Yosefa Loshitzky, Israel's Blonde Bombshells and Real Bombs in Gaza, THE
ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, Jan. 5, 2009, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/articlel0119.shtml. The public
relations campaign to justify Israel's attack was launched in the days preceding the war, see Jack
Khoury & Barak Ravid, Israel Kicks Off Global PR Campaign to Recruit Support for Gaza Raids,
HAARETZ, Dec. 21, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1048606.html, and was intensified as
the assault continued, see Barak Ravid, Israel to Mount Emergency International PR Effort in Wake of
Gaza Campaign, HAARETZ, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050402.html. On
the role gender images play in Israel's effort to win Western favor, see Aluf Benn, Bar Refaeli in Gaza,
HAARETZ, Feb.18, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1065135.html.
11. See, e.g., Press Briefing, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Plight of Civilians Traumatic in
'Full-blown Humanitarian Crisis' (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO
.nsf/ html/ palestine-press-briefing-060109?opendocument.
12. Ethan Bronner, Outcry Erupts Over Reports That Israel Used Phosphorous Arms on Gazans,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/middleeast/
22phosphorus.html?scp=1&sq israel%20whiteo20phosphorous&st-cse.
13. S.C. Res. 23, U.N. Doc S/2009/23 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N09/204/26/PDF/N0920426.pdfOpenElement.
14. "Hamas" is the acronym of the "Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya" the "Movement of
Islamic Resistance," and also means "enthusiasm" or "zeal" in Arabic. Hamas party members were
elected to a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006, and took over complete governing
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This article considers the possible violations of international law entailed in
Israel's twenty-two day assault on the Gaza Strip. The main bodies of law
applicable to the Gaza invasion are international humanitarian law, the central
purpose of which is to minimize human suffering in times of armed conflict, 16 and
international criminal law, which establishes state and individual culpability for
grave violations of international law, including for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.17 There is substantial evidence that Israel committed numerous
violations of international law, in some cases amounting to war crimes or crimes
against humanity, and this evidence is sufficient, at a minimum, to justify further
investigation. If such evidence is further substantiated, Israel could bear state
responsibility and Israeli political and military leaders could bear personal criminal
liability. If so, they should be held accountable for their transgressions.
The primary focus of the article is on major violations of international law
and ones that appear systemic-in other words, those which stem from policy
decision-making and military doctrines." Although the names of various Israeli
officials appear in the article in contexts that may suggest culpability for criminal
offenses, we make no allegations of individual responsibility here. Linking
identified individuals to definite, specific offenses would involve complex issues
of intent, and we make no pretense of having established such linkages in the
article.
We further maintain that Hamas forces also likely committed war crimes
during the fighting, particularly by undertaking indiscriminate attacks against
authority in Gaza in June 2007 in bitter fighting with its principal rival party, Fatah. On Hamas
generally, see KHALED HROUB, HAMAS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2000). On Hamas's rise
to power in the Gaza Strip, see David Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2008,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804.
15. Isabel Kershner, Few Israelis Near Gaza Feel War Achieved Much, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
2009, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/world/middleeast/21israel.html?
r-1&scp=2&sq=gaza%20ceasefire&st-cse.
16. In the words of one commentator: "International humanitarian law in armed conflicts is a
compromise between military and humanitarian requirements. Its rules comply with both military
necessity and the dictates of humanity." Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal
Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 37 (Dieter Fleck ed., rev. ed.
2008).
17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE CONFLICT IN GAZA: A BRIEFING ON
APPLICABLE LAW, INVESTIGATIONS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (2009), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/gazabriefing.pdf (arguing international human rights law provides an
additional layer of protections) [hereinafter The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law,
Investigations, andAccountability].
18. In some cases it may be difficult to distinguish between systemic wrongs and acts of
individual misconduct by Israeli troops, of which there is also some evidence. For example, in advance
of the Gaza assault, some Israeli troops had received a booklet prepared by Israel's chief military rabbi,
Brigadier General Avichai Rontzki, declaring that mercy in battle is "terribly immoral." Amos Harel,
IDF Rabbinate Publication During Gaza War: We Will Show No Mercy on the Cruel, HAARETZ, Jan.
16, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058758.html. If individual Israeli soldiers were
encouraged by the booklet to commit violations of laws of warfare, it is a difficult call as to whether
they would constitute systemic or simply individual wrongs.
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Israeli civilians. 19 But these offenses in no way justify or excuse Israel's violations,
which bore far more devastating consequences both for lives, for the prospects for
peace in the Middle East, and for the status of international law.20 Still, what is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and a fair course of action would entail
investigations of Hamas political and military leaders along with their Israeli
counterparts.
It is to be expected that combatants in a conflict would deny violations of
international law and would seek to justify their behavior by reference to legal
norms. 21 Thus, claims by any party about its wartime actions must be subjected to
critical and skeptical review. As noted above, Israel has invested substantial effort
in defending its actions before international public opinion.22 Having the advantage
of advance knowledge of the operation, not to mention greater resources and
familiarity with the sensibilities of Western audiences, Israel's public relations
21campaign has far exceeded that of its opponent,2 including, even, teleconferences
on Twitter and videos made available by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) via
YouTube.24 While ascertaining facts through the proverbial "fog of war" is always
19. See infra Section XIII.
20. 1,440 Palestinians were killed by Israel during the fighting, and 5,380 were wounded, U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian
Coordinator (Feb. 3-5, 2009), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisis/admin/output/files/
ocha optgaza humanitarian situation report 2009 02 05 english.pdfwhile nine Israelis- six
soldiers and three civilians - were killed by Palestinians (another four Israeli soldiers were killed by
"friendly fire"), Sebastian Rotella & Rushdi abu Alouf, Hamas Hints It's Open to Deal to End War,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A8. The impact of Israel's violations of international law on prospects for
peace in the region and on the stature of international law is addressed briefly in the Conclusion, infra
Section XV.
21. Indeed, it appears that Israeli military lawyers in the International Law Division of the office
of the Military Advocate General had carefully studied the possible justifications for Israel's military
actions, and also participated in briefings and operations planning during the assault itself. See Yotam
Feldman & Uri Blau, Consent and Advise, HAARETZ, February 5 2009, http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages/1059925.html [hereinafter Feldman & Blau].
22. Ethan Bronner of the New York Times further reported that members of the press, while
barred from entering Gaza, were provided with "full access to Israeli political and military
commentators eager to show them around southern Israel, where Hamas rockets have been terrorizing
civilians. A slew of private groups financed mostly by Americans are helping guide the press around
Israel." Ethan Bronner, Israel Keeping Reporters from Close Look at War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at
A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/middleeast/07media.html [hereinafter
Bronner].
23. A hint of such resources is offered in David Russell, Meet David Saranga, the Man Whose
Campaigns Are Rebranding Israel, THE JEWISH CHRONICLE, May 23, 2008, http://www.thejc.com
/articles/meet-david-saranga-man-whose-campaigns-are-rebranding-israel. Hamas's outreach was
limited to several op-eds in Western newspapers including: Mousa Abu Marzook, Hamas Speaks; A
'Legacy of Suffering' Fuels Palestinian Resistance, Says One of Its Leaders, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009,
at Al5, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-marzook6-
2009janO6,0,7451769.story; Mousa Abu Marzook, A Decisive Loss for Israel, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009 /jan/22/gaza-israel-palestine-hamas-obama;
Khalid Mish'al, This Brutality Will Never Break Our Will to be Free, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 6, 2009, at
26, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2009/jan/06/gaza-israel-hamas.
24. Noam Cohen, The Toughest Q's Answered in the Briefest Tweets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at
WK4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/weekinreview/04cohen.html. The Israel
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difficult, the challenges are greater when this "fog" is carefully planned and
deliberately manufactured. The challenge is compounded by the fact that Israel
largely barred Western reporters from entering the Gaza Strip during most of the
fighting on the grounds of security-rendering independent verification of the
realities of the assault all but impossible.25
There is, moreover, reason to suspect that Israel's spokespeople were not
consistently truthful in representing the actions of the Israel Defense Forces. This
seemed evident, for example, in exchanges over allegations that the Israeli military
had used white phosphorous shells. In a sequence chronicled by the Times of
London, Israel initially denied that its troops had used white phosphorous.26
Confronted with evidence to the contrary, Israeli spokespeople eventually admitted
that white phosphorous had been used by Israeli troops and that an investigation
for illegality in at least one instance was underway.27 Remarkably, however, Israeli
spokespeople ended the exchange with the Times by denying their initial denial of
white phosphorous use!28 Thus it has seemed prudent to this article's authors to
examine all of Israel's claims regarding the Gaza invasion with heightened
vigilance. 29 To repeat, however: such skepticism is always due, and examples of
other nations misrepresenting facts so as to justify the use of force are notably rife.
Israel, for its part, has accused Hamas of distorting figures concerning civilian
deaths due to the Gaza assault, and it would be naive not to consider that a real
possibility.30
The next section following this introduction explores the complex and
contentious issue of what law is applicable to Israel's recent invasion of the Gaza
Strip. Operation Cast Lead cannot be understood, either legally or politically, in a
historical vacuum. Thus, Section III will sketch the necessary backdrop to the
recent fighting, beginning with Israel's 2005 withdrawal of troops and settlers from
the Gaza Strip, and extending through the months directly preceding Israel's
Defense Forces Spokesperson's Unit Youtube channel can be viewed at
http://www.youtube.com/user/idfnadesk (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
25. Bronner, supra note 22..
26. Sheera Frenkel & Philippe Naughton, UN Headquarters in Gaza Hit by Israeli 'White
Phosphorus' Shells, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
middle east/article5521925.ece.
27. James Hider & Sheera Frenkel, White Phosphorus Was Used in Gaza, Ministry Says, TIMES
OF LONDON, Jan. 24, 2009, at 50, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
middle east/article5575070.ece (offering a chronology of the exchange).
28. Id.
29. Indeed, this article concludes that another frequent claim by Israel's defenders - that Hamas
fighters used Palestinian civilians as "human shields" - is poorly substantiated in the factual record. On
the contrary, there is stronger evidence that this banned practice was employed by Israeli troops; see
infra Section VII. Israel's credibility is also questioned by Kenneth Roth, The Incendiary IDF, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/incendiary-idf-
kenneth-roth.
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attack, during which a truce had prevailed. Section IV carefully examines Israel's
justification for launching its attack-that it was necessary to defend itself against
rocket fire emanating from the Gaza Strip-and ultimately rejects that claim.
Section V argues that, as Israel's assault was not justified by self-defense, in fact, it
may have constituted the crime of aggression. Section VI suggests that Israel
deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure and civilian individuals in acts that
constituted war crimes. Section VII examines the possibility that Israeli troops
used Palestinians as human shields and concludes that there is some evidence to
support such a charge. Section VIII reviews the question of proportionality and
finds that statements by Israeli leaders and facts of the battlefield strongly suggest
that Israel deliberately employed disproportionate force in its assault on Gaza.
Section IX reviews charges that Israel failed to meet its obligations to protect and
respect medical personnel and facilities, while Section X considers alleged Israeli
failures to allow treatment of the wounded and evacuation of the dead. Section XI
examines evidence that Israel used weapons illegally during the bombardment and
invasion. Section XII details the bottom line; that is, the deaths and destruction
caused by Operation Cast Lead. Section XIII looks at possible Hamas war crimes
and finds that Hamas likely launched indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians
in violation of the laws of war. Section XIV reviews state and individual liability,
and surveys possible venues for the prosecution of war crimes committed during
the Gaza invasion. Section XV offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE STATUS OF GAZA AND THE QUESTION OF APPLICABLE LAW
The international legal status of the Gaza Strip is currently contested. There is
no dispute that the Gaza Strip is not a sovereign state; rather, the main controversy
is whether or not, after Israel's 2005 "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip, the
territory remains subject to belligerent occupation within the meaning of
international law. Israel maintains that its evacuation from the Gaza Strip ended its
occupation,3 while other observers and commentators have maintained that the
occupation persists.32
31. The Disengagement Plan prepared by the government of Israel before the withdrawal, for
example, states: "Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of
Israel security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip . . . . As a result, there will be no
basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Disengagement Plan - General Outline (Apr. 18, 2004), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Disengagement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm[hereinafter
Disengagement Plan].
The Israeli High Court, in a case upholding the government's restrictions on the flow of electricity from
Israel to the Gaza Strip, has also held that the region is no longer occupied:
In this context, we note that since September 2005, Israel no longer has effective
control over what takes place within the territory of the Gaza Strip. The military
government that previously existed in that territory was abolished by means of a
decision of the government, and Israeli soldiers are not present in that area on a
permanent basis and do not direct what occurs there. In these circumstances,
under the international law of occupation, the State of Israel has no general
obligation to care for the welfare of the residents of the Strip or to maintain
public order within the Gaza Strip. Israel also does not have the effective
capability, in its current status, to maintain order and manage civilian life in the
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Whether Gaza is occupied or not is of considerable legal consequence. First,
international humanitarian law imposes affirmative duties on an occupier in its
treatment of the occupied civilian population. Israel, both before and during
Operation Cast Lead itself, failed its legal duties as an occupying authority.
Second, the law of occupation also restricts an occupier's right to use force in
maintaining public order in the territory it occupies. Israel, in unleashing its
powerful military against the Gaza Strip, vastly exceeded the limits of acceptable
legal force for an occupying authority. Third, if Israel continues to occupy the
Gaza Strip, it may not be able to plead self-defense as justification for Operation
Cast Lead. Arguably, a state cannot claim self-defense vis-A-vis a territory it has
already occupied. Finally, whether Israel's attack on the Gaza Strip constitutes the
crime of aggression may turn, in part, on the Strip's status, as that crime,
classically, involves an attack by one state against another state, rather than an
attack by a state on a non-state entity. For all these reasons, we must, as a
preliminary matter, clarify Gaza's current status in international law. The better
argument, in our view, is that the Gaza Strip continues to be occupied territory.
This section will lay out the arguments concerning the applicable law, while
subsequent sections will take up the factual record and detail the manners in which
Israel violated its legal obligations.
A. Israel's Continuing Occupation of the Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip was formerly part of the British Mandate for Palestine.33
Under the United Nations partition plan for Palestine, Gaza was slated to become
part of a Palestinian Arab state.34 That state never came to fruition, and after the
first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian administration.35
Israel seized control of the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank, Golan Heights,
and Sinai Peninsula) in the June 1967 war, immediately establishing a military
government there.36 Israel maintained that, because it had not displaced a
recognized sovereign state in taking control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
these territories were "administered" by Israel, but not "occupied" within the
meaning of international law. Israel's position was rejected by most authorities,
and in time, its status as an occupying power was confirmed by the International
Gaza Strip.
HCJ 9132/07 Gaber v. Prime Minister [2008] IsrSC 215, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR
/rdonlyres/938CCD2E-89C7-4E77-BO71-56772DFF79CC/O/HCJ Gazaelectricity.pdf
32. See infra notes 53, 63.
33. CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 106-07 (Katherine E.
Kurzman, Mary T. Stone, & Bridget Leahy eds., Bedford/St. Martin's 2001).
34. Id. at 192, 195, 202.
35. See id. at 203.
36. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government - The Initial
Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 1967-1980: THE
LEGAL ASPECTS 13, 21-22 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
37. This is sometimes referred to as the "missing reversioner" thesis. Yehuda Blum, The Missing
Reversioner: Reflections on the Status ofJudea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. R. 279 (1968).
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Court of Justice,38 the Oslo Accords, 39 the Israeli Supreme Court, 40 the UN
Security Council,41 the UN General Assembly,42 and the U.S. State Department.43
Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew its forces from its permanent
military bases in Gaza in 2005. Though Israel maintains that its "withdrawal" from
Gaza ended its occupation of the Strip 44 and that, accordingly, it no longer has any
obligations to the population of Gaza,45 it is still widely accepted that Israel
continues to occupy the Gaza Strip as a matter of international law.46
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations sets forth the legal standard
defining occupation: "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised."47 The
38. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 166 (July 9).
39. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION - NEGOTIATIONS AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, THE
ISRAELI "DISENGAGEMENT" PLAN: GAZA STILL OCCUPIED (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.nad-
plo.org/inner.php?view-factsgaza GAZA STILL OCCUPIED (citing Agreement on Preparatory
Powers and Responsibilities (Aug. 9, 1994), Art. XIII, §§ 4-5) [hereinafter Palestinian Liberation
Organization - Negotiations Affairs Department].
40. Id. (citing Ayub, et al. v. Minister ofDefense, et al, 606 II. H.C. 78; Adjuri v. IDF Commander,
7015 II. H.C. 02, 7019 II. H.C. 02 (2002); and 2056 II. H.C. 04 (2004)).
41. S.C. Res. 1544, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1544 (May 19, 2004), cited in Palestinian Liberation
Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39.
42. G.A. Res. 58/292, U.N. Doc. AIRES/58/292 (May 17, 2004), cited in Palestinian Liberation
Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39.
43. Palestinian Liberation Organization - Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39 (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm.
44. The Disengagement Plan prepared by the government of Israel before the withdrawal, for
example, states: "Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of
Israel security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of the Gaza Strip . . . As a result, there will be no
basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory." Disengagement Plan, supra note 31.
45. See, e.g., Israel's Revised Disengagement Plan, which states: "The completion of the plan will
serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip." Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Revised Disengagement Plan (June 6, 2004), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-
June-2004.htm [hereinafter Revised Disengagement Plan].
46. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other
Occupied Arab Territories, T 11(d), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/17 (Jan. 21, 2008) (prepared by John Dugard)
(stating that the "fact that Gaza remains occupied territory means that Israel's actions toward Gaza must
be measured against the standards of international humanitarian law") [hereinafter Human Rights
Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories]; see also Israel: Threatened Sanctions on
Gaza Violate Laws of War, Rocket Attacks Cannot Justify Collective Punishment, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/20/isrlpal6920.htm (stating
"Israel remains an occupying power in the Gaza Strip even though it withdrew its military forces and
illegal civilian settlers in August and September 2005") [hereinafter Rocket Attacks Cannot Justify
Collective Punishment]; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Sept. 24, 2009), available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html (stating the "West Bank
and Gaza Strip are Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; Israel removed settlers and
military personnel from the Gaza Strip in August 2005").
47. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539
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test to establish occupation under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations is that of
"effective control." 48
The test does not require the presence of permanent military personnel in the
occupied territory. 49 This principle was confirmed by the Nuremburg Tribunal in
USA v. Wilhelm List et al., in which the Tribunal determined that the German
occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia did not end with the withdraw of German
forces and the assertion of some degree of authority by indigenous groupings
because the German military could have reentered the territories and exercised
effective control at will.50
Israel maintains control over Gaza to a much greater degree than that
exercised by Germany over Yugoslavia and Greece, which it should be noted, are
significantly larger than the Gaza Strip. "The test for application of the legal
regime of occupation," the Tribunal stated in the List Case, "is not whether the
occupying power fails to exercise effective control over the territory, but whether it
has the ability to exercise such power."" Israel not only retains the ability to
exercise such power, but also continues actively to exercise such power. Israel, for
example, maintains authority over Gaza in accordance with its Revised
Disengagement Plan, which states: "Israel will guard and monitor the external land
perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza
airspace, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of
the Gaza Strip." 52
Indeed, Israel regularly patrols Gaza's airspace-legally, part of Gaza's
territory-with both manned and unmanned aircraft. Israeli naval ships, moreover,
daily patrol Gaza's territorial waters.54 Additionally, Israel regularly conducts
military operations within Gaza itself,Q5 and the withdrawal of its land troops has
had little effect on the frequency, scale, or destructiveness of Israeli military
activities in the Strip.56 Israeli military forces killed approximately 1,250
[hereinafter Hague IV].
48. lain Scobbie, An Intimate Disengagement: Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law of
Occupation and ofSelf-Determination, 11 Y.B. ISLAMIC AND MID. EASTERN L. 3, 20-22 (2004-05).
49. Id.
50. U.S. v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Hostages Trial), 15 I.L.R. 646 (Nuremberg Military Tribunal
1948), quoted in Palestinian Liberation Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39.
5 1. Id.
52. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 45.
53. B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF THE AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF THE GAZA STRIP, available at http://www.btselem.org/english/gazastrip/control-on
air space and territorial waters.asp [hereinafter Israel's Control of the Airspace and Territorial
Waters of the Gaza Strip]; see also Jimmy Johnson, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Warfare of
Inequality Management, THE ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, Feb. 17, 2009, availale at
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10312.shtml (discussing Israel's use of unmanned aircraft).
54. Israel's Control of the Airspace and Territorial Waters of the Gaza Strip, supra note 53.
55. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror in Gaza: Twelve Months Since the Hamas Takeover
(June 16, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/ Palestinian+
terror+since+2000/Terror+in+Gaza-+Two+months+since+the+Hamas +takeover+ 16-Aug-2007.htm.
56. In March of 2008, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai stated that Israeli forces "are
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Palestinians in the Gaza Strip between September 2005 and December 27, 2008.
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 112
Palestinians were killed in Gaza in 2005, 531 in 2006, 301 in 2007, and 389 in the
first ten months of 2008.
Finally, Israel exercises almost complete control over the movement of people
and goods into and out of the Strip.5 9 The Rafah Crossing with Egypt is operated in
accordance with an agreement concluded between the Palestinian Authority and
Israel, by which the Palestinian Authority and Egypt are authorized to administer
the crossing,60 but Israel is able to shut the crossing at will.6 1 Israel also continues
to control Gaza's telecommunications network, electricity and sewage systems,
62
and population registry. Control of Gaza's population registry gives Israel the
authority to determine legal residency in Gaza, thus allowing the Israeli military
the power to prevent the entrance into the Strip of Palestinians it chooses not to
61
register.
The degree of control Israel retains over the Gaza Strip makes it clear that, in
the words of UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard, "statements by the government
of Israel that the withdrawal ended the occupation are grossly inaccurate."64
B. Israel's obligations under the Law of Occupation
International humanitarian law imposes specific obligations on occupying
powers, among them Israel in its continuing occupation of the Gaza Strip. These
obligations are spelled out in provisions of the Hague Convention (II) respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed regulations of 190765, the
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
permanently engaged in Gaza and what we are doing now is within the scope of such activities." Steven
Erlanger & Taghreed El-Khodary, Israel Takes Gaza Fight to Next Level in a Day of Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/middleeast/
02niideast.html?hp.
57. Victor Kattan, Gaza: Not a War of Self-Defense, JURIST (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/01/gaza-not-war-of-self-defense.php (citing information collected
by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory,
http://www.ochaopt.org/) [hereinafter Kattan].
58. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Protection of Civilians: Casualties Database, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/poc/ (click Download
the Casualties Summary Statistics in Excel Format).
59. Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 46, at
11.
60. Palestinian Liberation Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39.
61. Rocket Attacks Cannot Justify Collective Punishment, supra note 46.
62. Gaza: Israel's Fuel and Power Cuts Violate Laws of War, Civilians Should Not be Penalized
for Rocket Attacks by Armed Groups, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 29, 2007, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/29/isrlpal7198 txt.htm.
63. Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 46, at
11.
64. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/5 (Sept. 5, 2006).
65. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403
[hereinafter Hague Il].
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War of 194966, and customary norms of international law pertaining to belligerent
occupation. As a general matter, these regulations are designed to reduce the
impact of military occupation on civilian life to the maximum extent possible,
while preserving the freedom of the occupier to act according to military
necessity.67
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, for example, requires that an occupying
power "take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country." 68 The Fourth Geneva Convention describes civilians who fall
under the control of a foreign military authority as "protected persons,"69 and vests
the occupying forces with responsibility to ensure their basic welfare. Article 3 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that civilians must be treated humanely. 70
71Occupying authorities may not willfully kill, ill-treat, or deport protected persons,
and may seize or destroy civilian property only if militarily necessary.72 Occupiers
must ensure supplies of food and medical supplies, 73  and facilitate the care and
education of children.74 In the event that food or other vital supplies in the territory




All of these duties were incumbent upon Israel in its occupation of the Gaza
Strip. Subsequent sections will demonstrate that Israel violated many of its legal
obligations under the law of occupation, before and during Operation Cast Lead.
C. Law enforcement or "armed conflict"?
While an occupying force has a duty-and a right-to maintain public order in
an occupied territory, its obligation to protect the civilian population implies limits
on the amount of force that can be lawfully employed to fulfill that duty.
According to Amnesty International:
Under normal circumstances, the occupying power is bound by law
enforcement standards derived from human rights law when maintaining
order in occupied territory. For example, these would require the
66. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
67. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary to Article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention states that "regulations concerning occupation are based on the idea of the personal
freedom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired." International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600032?OpenDocument (last visited October 1, 2009).
68. Hague II, supra note 65, at art. 43.
69. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 4.
70. Id. at art. 3. This article is common to the four Geneva Conventions, and is often referred to
as "Common Article 3."
71. Id. at art. 49.
72. Id. at art. 53.
73. Id. at art. 55.
74. Id. at art. 50.
75. Id. at art. 60.
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occupying power to seek to arrest, rather than kill, members of armed
groups suspected of carrying out attacks, and to use the minimum
amount of force necessary in countering any security threat.76
Nonetheless, Israel has been pressing to shift the legal basis for its troops'
operations in the Occupied Territories since 2001 from a law enforcement model to
one of "armed conflict." This move was necessary because some of Israel's
practices in suppressing the second Palestinian "intifada" ("uprising")-also called
the "al-Aksa Intifada" -clearly departed from a law enforcement model. The most
obvious of these practices was "targeted killings," in which Israel was
assassinating Palestinian leaders and other militants in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip without making any attempt to arrest them.78 While Israel had engaged in
deliberate killings of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since the 1970s, it
had generally done so surreptitiously, by means of "death squads"-and had
typically denied the practice.79 During the al-Aksa Intifada, however, the scale of
these killings greatly increased.o Moreover, Israel resorted, in some cases, to
highly public means of killings-including bombings by air-that often caused many
civilian casualties, and in which the absence of any attempt to arrest was patent.
In 2002, for example, an Israeli F-16 fighter-bomber dropped a one ton bomb on
an apartment building in Gaza, killing Hamas military wing leader Salah Shehadeh
and fourteen innocent bystanders.82 Israel had also resorted to massive violence in
suppressing riots, including the use of helicopter gunships, tanks, and F- 16 aircraft,
that did not square easily with a law enforcement model.83
Israeli representatives attempted to justify these actions by arguing that the
circumstances prevailing in the Occupied Territories constituted an "armed conflict
short of war." Israeli submissions to the "Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding
Committee" headed by former-U.S. Senator George Mitchell in April 2001
76. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 6.
77. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
78. Id.
79. STEVEN R. DAVID, FATAL CHOICES: ISRAEL'S POLICY OF TARGETED KILLINGS 7 (The Begin-
Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University: Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 51
2002), available at http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/david.pdf.
80. Id. See also Yossi Melman, Targeted Killings: A Retro Fashion Very Much in Vogue,
HAARETz, Mar. 15, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=407999&contrass
ID=2. According to Gal Luft, Israel committed at least eighty targeted killings in the first two years of
the al-Aqsa Intifada. Gal Luft, The Logic oflsrael's Targeted Killings, 10 MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY 1,
Winter 2003.
81. This does not mean, however, that Israel abandoned its use of death squads during the al-Aqsa
Intifada. See Donald Macintyre, Israel's Death Squads: A Soldier's Story, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 1,
2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israels-death-squads-a-
soldiers-story-1634774.html.
82. Gideon Levy, At the Salah Shehadeh Home in Gaza City, Znet, Aug. 2, 2002,
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/11823; see also Yuval Yoaz, State Commission to Examine
Civilian Deaths in 2002 Shahade Assassination, HAARETZ, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com
/hasen/spages/904552.html.
83. ZEEV MAOz, DEFENDING THE HOLY LAND: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY 265 (2006).
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claimed that Israel was facing "live fire attacks on a significant scale" carried out
by "a well-armed and organised militia." 84
While the phrase "armed conflict short of war" had no established meaning in
international law, the Mitchell committee report did not categorically repudiate it.
It noted that in the great majority of confrontations with the Israeli military during
the uprising-73 percent-Palestinians were, in fact, unarmed, and recommended
that "the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal
responses to unarmed demonstrators."" It also criticized the application of the
"armed conflict short of war" notion as "overly broad," and counseled against its
"blanket" use.8 6 But in doing so, the Report appeared to accept the possibility that
the categorization could be valid for some kinds of confrontations between the
Israeli military and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
Needless to say, the Mitchell Report pronounced the opinions of its authors,
not international law. Nonetheless, its tacit and partial acceptance of Israel's
"armed conflict" model opened the door for an adaptation of the law of occupation
that permitted war like tactics in occupied territories when fighting there reached a
requisite scale and level of intensity.
The question of which model should govern the Israeli military's actions in
the Occupied Territories-law enforcement or armed conflict-was squarely
confronted by the Israeli High Court in its 2006 judgment in a challenge to the
Israeli military's "targeted killings." The High Court held that: "The general,
principled starting point is that between Israel and the various terrorist
organizations active in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip (hereinafter "the area")
a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the first intjfada,"87and
that the applicable law, therefore, was that of international armed conflict.88 The
84. SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT FINDING COMMITTEE, THE MITCHELL REPORT 24 (Apr. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/ACF319
.pdf.
85. Id. at 24, 35.
86. Id. at 25.
87. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [2005] IsrSC 9, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf.
88. Id. at 11. The High Court also found that, where the law of international humanitarian law left
gaps, these gaps could be filled by reference to international human rights law. It further rejected the
relevance of the law of non-international armed conflict International humanitarian law regulates both
international armed conflicts and non-international ones (that is, conflicts occurring within the borders
of a single state), but the sources of law for the two kinds of conflicts differ. The principal sources of
law governing international armed conflict are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (excluding
Common Article 3), and the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Non-international
armed conflicts, on the other hand, are governed by Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions,
and the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Rule of Law of Armed Conflicts Project, The
Qualification of Conflicts, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS,http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification of armed conflict.php. The main difference
between these two branches of international humanitarian law is that, while the law of international
armed conflicts includes a clear definition of a "combatant," and thus, by contrast, a clear means of
identifying "non-combatants," the law of non-international conflict lacks such definitions. The Conflict
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court upheld the practice of targeted killings under limited circumstances, but
relied on principles from Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, even though Israel
has neither signed Protocol I nor has it enacted any legislation implementing the
Protocol. 89 The High Court thus acknowledged that Protocol I is part of customary
international law, including most critically, the protection in Article 51(3) for
civilians not taking "direct part in hostilities," and, as such, was binding on Israeli
troops operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 90
It can be inferred from the Israeli government's recent actions and statements
that it has treated Operation Cast Lead as if it were an international armed conflict.
Israel's attempted invocation of its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, and reporting its actions to the United Nations Security
Council, are practices consistent with an international armed conflict.91 Israel's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has cited articles of Additional Protocol I - which
deals with international armed conflict - in accusing Hamas of war crimes during
the Gaza fighting.92
Neutral observers, such as Amnesty International, seem to have accepted the
Israeli view that at least some military operations in occupied territories should be
judged according to "armed conflict" standards. "However, if a situation arises in
which fighting inside the occupied territory reaches the requisite scale and
intensity, then international humanitarian law rules governing humane conduct in
warfare apply . . ."9 In Annesty's view, which model applies turns on the
particular circumstances. For example, facing a demonstration during a conflict an
occupier must revert to law enforcement, not armed conflict, standards.94
There is, of course, some appeal to treating different kinds of military
occupations according to flexible legal standards; arguably, Israel's powers and
responsibilities as an occupying power should be adjusted in some sense to reflect
the changed circumstances following its 2005 "disengagement" from the Gaza
Strip. In particular, Israel is no longer in charge of day-to-day administration of
Palestinian affairs and has no permanently stationed troops there, and these
changes would, presumably, limit Israel's capacity to meet its full obligations
under the established law of occupation. Indeed, Hebrew University law professor
in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability, supra note 17, at 11.
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id.
91. Identical Letters Dated 27 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, supra
note 3.
92. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAMAS'S ILLEGAL ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
AND OTHER UNLAWFUL METHODS OF WAR (2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Legal aspects of Hamas methods 7 Jan 2009.htm.
93. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing of Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 7. In another view, Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip are subject both to international
humanitarian law concerning armed conflicts and the law of occupation. Geneva Academy of
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, Qualification of Armed
Conflicts (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification of armed conflict.php.
94. Id.
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Yuval Shany advises "the establishment of nuanced tests, which permit varying
levels of legal responsibilities commensurate with varying levels of physical
control" for the situation in Gaza and for other "post-modem" occupations.95 The
Israeli High Court has taken tentative steps in that direction in a case upholding the
legality of Israel's restrictions on the supply of industrial fuel and electricity to the
Gaza Strip. The High Court held that, while occupation of the Gaza Strip had
formally ended, Israel had ongoing responsibilities toward the Gaza Strip due to its
control of its borders and airspace, and by virtue of the Strip's dependence on
Israel resulting from 38 years of military occupation.96 The Court appeared to be
recognizing an intermediary position between the "all" of the full law of
occupation or the "nothing" of a military's responsibilities toward territories
outside of its boundaries.
Yet any movement toward flexible standards for belligerent occupants-either
in determining whether an occupation exists as a matter of international law, or in
judging which among the duties of the law of occupation should pertain in
particular circumstances or not-could initiate a significant erosion of the
protections afforded by international humanitarian law. We should, accordingly,
consider such shifts with extreme caution. It is by virtue of superior military
strength that occupiers become occupiers; it is to be expected, therefore, that they
would press for legal standards that permit them to exploit their military
advantage. It will be belligerent occupants who will choose when and where to
resort to the "armed conflict" model, and which of their duties under the law of
occupation they may suspend, and for how long. It is, moreover, comparatively
easy for any occupying power to manufacture circumstances that could be
95. Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex Reality: The Gaza Occupation Debate, 41 ISR.L.R.
68, 86 (2008).
96. In the words of the court:
In this context, we note that since September 2005, Israel no longer has effective
control over what takes place within the territory of the Gaza Strip. The military
government that previously existed in that territory was abolished by means of a
decision of the government, and Israeli soldiers are not present in that area on a
permanent basis and do not direct what occurs there. In these circumstances,
under the international law of occupation, the State of Israel has no general
obligation to care for the welfare of the residents of the Strip or to maintain
public order within the Gaza Strip. Israel also does not have the effective
capability, in its current status, to maintain order and manage civilian life in the
Gaza Strip. Under the circumstances that have developed, the primary obligations
imposed on the State of Israel regarding residents of the Gaza Strip are derived
from the state of warfare that currently ensues between Israel and the Hamas
organization which controls the Gaza Strip; these obligations also stem from the
degree of control that the State of Israel has at the border crossings between it
and the Gaza Strip; and also from the situation that was created between the State
of Israel and the territory of the Gaza Strip after years of Israeli military control
in the area, following which the Gaza Strip is now almost totally dependent on
Israel for its supply of electricity.
HCJ 9132/07 Gaber v. Prime Minister [2008] IsrSC 8, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/
rdonlyres/938CCD2E-89C7-4E77-BO71-56772DFF79CC/O/HCJGazaelectricity.pdf.
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presented to the outside world to justify the use of military force on a large scale-
and to be judged according to the "armed conflict" standard. Cleaving to the law
enforcement standard, on the contrary, affords occupiers prospective clarity over
their responsibilities and allows others to retrospectively assess to what extent
those responsibilities have been met.
It should be noted that Israel's attempt to remake international humanitarian
law-in this and in other respects-is completely self-conscious and deliberate. As
Colonel Daniel Reisner, former head of the International Law Division of the
Israeli Military Advocate General, stated in a recent interview:
If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The
whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is
forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries. .
. International law progresses through violations. We invented the
targeted assassination thesis and we had to push it. At first there were
protrusions that made it hard to insert easily into the legal moulds. Eight
years later it is in the center of the bounds of legitimacy. 97
Permitting Israel to maintain its occupation through effective control of the
Gaza Strip, while freeing its military to use massive force against the residents of
the region, is fundamentally unfair. It is contrary to the aim of international
humanitarian law to minimize civilian suffering in times of war. It forces the
people of the Gaza Strip to face one of the most powerful militaries in the world
without the benefit either of its own military, or of any realistic means to acquire
the means to defend itself.98 Thus, we believe that Israel's attempt to transform
international humanitarian law in this respect should be firmly resisted, and that its
military's operations in the Gaza Strip should continue to be evaluated by law
enforcement standards.
At the same time, we cannot say that Israel's effort has failed; as we have
noted above, observers appear to have accepted Israel's position, and have
analyzed Operation Cast Lead as if it were an instance of "international armed
conflict." Therefore, we will consider Israel's actions during Operation Cast Lead
according to the law of occupation, where appropriate, and according to the law of
international armed conflict. Under either legal regime, however, Israel appears to
have committed massive violations.
III. PRELUDE To THE INVASION
In one sense, Israel's December 2008 attack on the Gaza Strip was not a
"war" in itself. Rather, it was an abrupt escalation in a conflict that had been
previously simmering for months, if not years. Placing the invasion in proper
context requires that we trace developments since 2005, when Israel withdrew its
97. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
98. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Military
Expenditures,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html?
countryName=Israel&countryCode=is&regionCode=me&rank=6#is (showing Israel spends 7.3% of
GDP on military).
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settlers and troops from the Gaza Strip, as we have seen, claiming to end its then
thirty-eight year military occupation of the region.99 Day-to-day administration of
Gaza thereafter was left in the hands of the Palestinian Authority. 100
A. The 2006 Elections
In January 2006, members of the Hamas-affiliated "Change and Reform" list
won seventy-six of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, and with this
majority, earned the right to form the next cabinet in the Palestinian Authority.o
Israel and the United States quickly initiated sanctions against the Territories and
Hamas, demanding that they recognize Israel, renounce all violence, and agree to
honor previous agreements signed by Palestinian leaders. 102 Israel withheld $50
million in customs revenues it had collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority,
freezing assets while tightening restrictions and prohibitions on the movement of
people and goods into, out of, and within the Territories. 103 Meanwhile the United
States barred access to U.S. banking and foreign aid.104 The election results spurred
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah to join Hamas officials in creating a
unity government that took office on March 17, 2007.105
The freezing of assets and the imposition of economic sanctions, even before
Hamas' formation of a government, set the stage for impending fissures in the
fragile coalition. The sanctions compelled the Palestinian Authority to suspend
salary payments to 160,000 civil servants in the Occupied Territories by the
following March. 106
B. The Hamas takeover and Israel's response
By June 2007, tensions between Hamas and Fatah spilled over into armed
conflict in the streets of Gaza.1 0 7 By some reports, Hamas feared an impending
coup against it by followers of Fatah and attacked preemptively, routing Fatah
fighters within a matter of days and establishing Hamas as the sole ruling party in
99. See supra Section II.
100. The Palestinian Authority is an entity created by the "Oslo Accords," a series of agreements
between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization between 1993 and 1998.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has exercised limited powers of administration in parts of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip over the Palestinian residents of those regions. The PA is headed by an elected
president, and by a prime minister. The Palestinian Legislative Council acts as the PA parliament. See
generally GEOFFREY WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000).
101. Scott Wilson, Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 27,2006, at Al.
102. ALJAZEERA.NET, Middle East News, Profile, Hamas, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2009/01/20091115216586178.html.
103. Israel to Impose Hamas Sanctions, BBC NEWS, February 19, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle east/4729000.stm.
104. Id.
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the Gaza Strip. 108 The schism occurred amidst ongoing clashes between Israel and
Hamas fighters, leading up to an Israeli ground incursion into the Strip on June
27.109
Israel responded to Hamas' ascension by imposing a blockade against the
Gaza Strip, tightly restricting the flow of goods and people into and out of the
Gaza Strip. 1 o The effects of the closure and the isolation of the Gazan population
were dire. Poverty reached exorbitant levels and unemployment approached 40
percent (some estimates were well above 50 percent)."' Just prior to Operation
Cast Lead, 60 percent of Gazans were living below the poverty line, 35 percent in
112extreme poverty. Over 80 percent of the population became dependent upon
some form of humanitarian aid.113
By February 2008, the number of truckloads of aid allowed to enter the Strip
had declined by 86 percent from the year before the blockade. 114 Since those
figures were released, there have been even steeper cutoffs in aid, with near-
complete closure of all crossings into and out of the Strip between November 5 and
16, 2008.115 During Operation Cast Lead, an average of thirty truckloads per day
bearing food, cargo, and basic necessities were allowed into Gaza by Israeli
authorities that went to support a dependent population of over one million.1 16 For
the trickle of supplies that managed to reach Palestinians inside Gaza during that
time, tons more spoiled under the sun at border crossings, barred passage by the
Israeli military. 17
Restrictions and closures along the coast and at the borders have had
108. David Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.vanityfair.com
/politics/features /2008/04/gaza2008O4.
109. Ian Fisher & Taghreed El-Khodary, Israelis Kill 11 Militants Inside Gaza; 2 Civilians Die,
NY TIMES, June 28, 2007, at AO.
110. Heather Sharp, Guide: Gaza Under Blockade, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7545636.stm [hereinafter Sharp].
111. INT'L MONETARY FUND AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE MEETING, MACROECONOMIC AND
FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 2, n. 1 (2007), available at http://domino.
un.org /pdfs/IMF AHLCrep240907.pdf.
112. Id.
113. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: Occupied
Palestinian Territory, The Closure of the Gaza Strip: The Economic and Humanitarian Consequences,
at 1 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Gaza Special Focus
December_2007.pdf.
114. OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, THE GAZA STRIP: A HUMANITARIAN IMPLOSION 8 (Sept. 2008),
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/oxfam gaza lowres.pdf [hereinafter A
Humanitarian Implosion].
115. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interview with Katharina Ritz Head of Mission for the
Occupied Territories, Gaza: Responding to Urgent Medical Needs of Choked-off Strip,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-interview-181108.
116. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor:
Occupied Palestinian territory, No. 32 (Dec. 2008), available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/
db942872b9eae454852560f6005a76fb/204aadb8b6892b4a852575440067b032?OpenDocument.
117. Michael Slackman, At a Border Crossing, Drivers and Truckloads of Aid for Gaza Go
Nowhere, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/world/africa/28iht-egypt.1.19737976.html.
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oppressive and disastrous consequences on the general population. Fuel restrictions
and naval patrols have decreased the output of Gaza's fishing industries by 98
percent, exacerbating unemployment and the dependency on aid.11 8 Lack of
imports and raw materials have shut down private businesses and industrial
factories. 119 Reduced fuel and lack of spare parts have strained sewage treatment,
waste management, water supply, and hospitals. 120 B'Tselem, a human rights
group, described the humanitarian crisis in Gaza,
As a result of the [blockade], the stocks of imported food products in
Gaza are dwindling, driving their prices sky-high, while fruit and
vegetables that were intended for export are being sold in Gazan
markets at a loss. Many families cannot afford to buy them, however,
due to the high poverty rate in Gaza. 80 percent of Gazan households
now live below the poverty line, subsisting on less than 2,300 shekels a
month for a family of six. Households in deep poverty, living on less
than 1,837 shekels a month, currently comprise 66.7 percent of the
population. 80 percent of all Gazan families would literally starve
without food aid from international agencies. 121
Under customary international law, a blockade is an act of war. 122 It is
employed to cut off communications and supplies of an enemy. 123 While the
modem concept extends beyond its original and exclusive maritime roots to
include both land and technological blockades, the consistent feature is that a
blockade's purpose has been to deprive a military adversary of necessary
supplies. 124 A belligerent imposing a blockade upon a region consisting of a
civilian population must allow the free passage of relief consignments to the
civilian population. 125 In fact, the legality of a blockade under customary
international law hinges on the requirement that aid for the civilian population be
met with free passage. 126
118. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 23 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/
documents/HM Mar 2008.pdf.
119. A Humanitarian Implosion, supra note 114, at 4-5.
120. Sharp, supra note 110.
121. B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: TIGHTENED SIEGE AND INTENSIFIED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,
available at http://www.btselem.org/english/Gaza Strip/Siege Tightening.asp.
122. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. I, at 408 (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed.,
Max Planck Inst. for Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhardt
2000).
123. See id.
124. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 2095 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski,
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987).
125. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. IV, at 1401 (Peter MacAlister-Smith
ed., Max Planck Inst. for Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf
Bernhardt 2000).
126. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Vol. II, at 1189 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2005) [hereinafter
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The reasons cited for Israel's refusal to allow passage of basic necessities are
untenable. Israel claimed that its restrictions were necessary to put pressure on
Hamas officials to halt or substantially hinder the firing of rockets into Southern
Israel. However, there is no reasonable relationship between depriving Gazan
civilians of subsistence items and the suppression of Hamas' rocket launchings
against Israeli towns. Israel's duties to "protected persons" as an occupier of the
Gaza Strip under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention require that it allow
the passage of all aid, foodstuffs, and water given the severity of the humanitarian
crisis. The blockade appears to have clearly violated this provision of the law of
occupation.
C. The blockade as Collective Punishment
Israel's blockade, which by the launching of Operation Cast Lead had
persisted for eighteen months, violated international law in another respect. Under
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "No protected person may be
punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism . . . against
protected persons and their property are prohibited."1 27
This article prohibits the use of collective punishment of protected persons,
the breach of which constitutes war crimes. 128 "Protected persons" are civilian
individuals who find themselves, in case of an armed conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a power of which they are not nationals. 129 The term has also been applied
more specifically to refugees and stateless persons. 130
A blockade against a civilian population inherently raises concerns of
collective punishment because of the effect that prohibiting food and other
essentials may have, particularly over the long run, on the survival of that
population. According to Amnesty International's Middle East and North Africa
program director, Malcolm Smart, Israel's action "appears calculated to make an
already dire humanitarian situation worse, one in which the most vulnerable-the
sick, the elderly, women and children-will bear the brunt, not those responsible
for the attacks against Israel."l 31
To reiterate: Israel instituted the blockade against the Gaza Strip not in
response to a violent attack, but rather in response to Hamas's ascension to
exclusive authority in the Gaza Strip, and earlier in response to the Hamas victory
in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Israel, in short, engaged in an act of war against
an occupied people, and violated its legal obligations to them long before
Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. Il].
127. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 33.
128. Id.
129. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw vol. III, at 1144 (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed.
Max Planck Inst. For Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhardt
2000).
130. Id. at 1146.
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Operation Cast Lead had commenced.
D. The Truce
Hamas and Israel arrived at a truce agreement, which became effective on
June 19, 2008.132 Israel has consistently claimed that its military offensive in Gaza
came about as a result of Hamas' violation of this ceasefire. Foreign Minister
Livni, for example, stated the day after the commencement of Operation Cast Lead
that "the calm that was achieved through" the truce "worked for a few weeks, and
then Hamas deliberately violated the truce by targeting Israel on a daily basis" and
by taking other actions contrary to the truce agreement.13 Livni's assertion that
Hamas first violated the ceasefire, and the corresponding implication that Israel
abided by its terms, excludes important facts.
One such fact is the blockade described in the previous section. In addition to
providing for the cessation of Israeli military operations in the Strip and an ending
of Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel (the parties' adherence to these
provisions will be addressed below), the June agreement required Israel to ease its
blockade of Gaza. 134 Israel did not adequately abide by this obligation. On
November 29, 2008-five months after the truce went in to effect-Human Rights
Watch published a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressing "deep
concern about Israel's continuing blockade of the Gaza Strip, a measure that is
depriving its population of food, fuel, and basic services, and constitutes a form of
collective punishment."1 35 "The latest measures [taken by Israel]," the letter
continued, "are part of an ongoing policy by your government that has prevented
the normal flow of goods and people in and out of Gaza since January 2006. It has
contributed to a humanitarian crisis, deepened poverty and ruined the economy."l36
Referring specifically to the truce agreement, Human Rights watch noted: "Israel
made a commitment in June to ease some of these restrictions - but the movement
of goods into Gaza and people in and out of the territory remains a fraction of what
it was when borders were last opened for free trade."1 37
E. Israel's November 4 Raids
Israel's primary justification for its invasion of Gaza was rocket attacks
launched from the Strip, attacks which Israel has repeatedly asserted were
132. Israel and Hamas 'Agree Truce', BBC NEWS, June 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle east/7459200.stm [hereinafter Israel and Hamas Agree Truce].
133. Tzipi Livni, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs, Briefing in Sderot - Opening Remarks (Dec.
28, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Govemment/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2008/
FM Livni briefingSderot Opening remarks 28-Dec-2008.htm [hereinafter Livni Briefing in Sderot].
134. Hamas Fires Rockets at Israel After Airstrike, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A10
[hereinafter Hamas Fires Rockets at Israel After Airstrike]; Israel and Hamas Agree Truce, supra note
132.
135. Human Rights Watch, Letter to Olmert: Stop the Blockade of Gaza,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/20/letter-olmert-stop-blockade-gaza [hereinafter Letter to Olmert:
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unprovoked violations of the ceasefire. 138 Indeed, rocket attacks from Gaza
increased in the weeks immediately preceding the offensive of December 27.139
But these attacks followed Israeli operations which killed six Palestinians in Gaza
on November 4. Before Israel's violation of the ceasefire in these raids, rocket
attacks from Gaza had stopped almost entirely, totaling only one a month in July,
September, and October and eight in the month of August.140 It was not until after
the November 4 raids that rocket attacks from Gaza began increasing in number,
and indeed the Washington Post reported on November 5 that Hamas' assertion of
responsibility for the attacks in response to the Israeli operations was the "first
such announcement by the group since the Egyptian-brokered cease-fire went into
effect June 19.",141
Thus, Hamas was, according the Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, "careful to
maintain the ceasefire", and it "tried to enforce the terms of the arrangement on the
other terrorist organizations and to prevent them from violating it."1 42 In regards to
stopping attacks on Israel, the ceasefire was, in the words of a study conducted by
MIT professor Nancy Kanwisher and others, "remarkably effective." 143 "After it
began in June 2008, the rate of rocket and mortar fire from Gaza dropped to almost
zero, and stayed there for months." 144 "The latest ceasefire," Kanwisher concludes,
"ended when Israel first killed Palestinians, and Palestinians then fired rockets into
Israel."1 45
138. Speaking before the United Nations Security Council on December 31, 2008, Israel's UN
Ambassador Gabriela Shalev reported that in the preceding weeks Israel had "witnessed a steep
escalation in the attacks of Hamas against Israel" and that Israel launched its military operation on
December 27 with the aim of "protecting Israelis living in Southern Israel from the incessant barrage of
rocket and mortar shell fire." Gabriela Shalev, Israel Ambassador to the UN, Statement by Amb Shalev
to UN Security Council (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Foreign+Relations/Israel+and+the+UN/Speeches+-+statements/Statement Amb Shalev UN Security
Council 3 1-Dec-2008.htm? WBCMODE=PresentationUnpCredits.
139. Nancy Kanwisher, Johannes Haushofer & Anat Biletzki, Reigniting Violence: How Do
Ceasefires End?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/nancy-
kanwisher/reigniting-violence-how-d b_155611 html [hereinafter How Do Ceasefires End?].
140. Id.
141. Hamas Fires Rockets At Israel After Airstrike, supra note 134.
142. Norman G. Finkelstein, Foiling Another Palestinian "Peace Offensive": Behind the
Bloodbath in Gaza, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, Jan. 19, 2009,
http://www.normanfinkelstein.conVfinkelstein-on-gaza-war-massacre (quoting THE SIX MONTHS OF
THE LULL ARRANGEMENT 2, 7 (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage & Commemoration Center, Dec. 2008)) [hereinafter Finkelstein].
143. How Do Ceasefires End?, supra note 139.
144. Id.
145. This pattern is not unusual. Examining all the periods of one or more days without a death on
either side from September 2000 until October 2008, Kanwisher has established that "it is
overwhelmingly Israel that kills first after a pause in the conflict: 79% of all conflict pauses were
interrupted when Israel killed a Palestinian, while only 8% were interrupted by Palestinian attacks (the
remaining 13% were interrupted by both sides on the same day)." The study continues:
In addition, we found that this pattern - in which Israel is more likely than
Palestine to kill first after a conflict pause - becomes more pronounced for longer
conflict pauses. Indeed, of the 25 periods of nonviolence lasting longer than a
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Israel's November 4 military operations in Gaza, which ended a four-month
period of relative calm, severely weaken Israel's claim of self-defense. Nothing in
international law allows a state to use armed force to provoke-whether
intentionally or not-an attack and then use that attack as a basis for a claim of self-
defense.146
IV. ISRAEL'S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE
Israel has characterized its latest operations in Gaza as actions taken in self-
defense. On the opening day of the offensive, Israel's UN Ambassador stated in a
letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations that "after a long period of
utmost restraint, the government of Israel has decided to exercise, as of this
morning, its right to self-defense."147 Echoing this claim the following day, Israeli
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated: "[T]he only way in which maybe we can
shorten the time of the military operation is by making it clear that Israel has the
right to defend itself, that the international community supports Israel as it
continues to work against Hamas." 148
The Charter of the United Nations explicitly preserves the right of states to act
in self-defense. 149 It is, however, a limited exception to the general obligation
established in the Charter that states resolve their disputes by pacific means.
Under Article 51, a state making a claim of self-defense must have been the target
of an "armed attack" by another state. 150 Moreover, the exercise of self-defense
must be both necessary and "proportional"-that is, limited in scope to redress the
week, Israel unilaterally interrupted 24, or 96%, and it unilaterally interrupted
100% of the 14 periods of nonviolence lasting longer than 9 days....The lessons
from these data are clear: First, Hamas can indeed control the rockets, when it is
in their interest. The data shows that ceasefires can work, reducing violence to
nearly zero for months at a time. Second, if Israel wants to reduce rocket fire
from Gaza, it should cherish and preserve the peace when it starts to break out,
not be the first to kill.
Id.
146. The fact that Hamas's rocket attacks may themselves constitute serious violations of the laws
of war does nothing to change this, for, as was stated at Nuremburg in regard to the Nazi occupation of
the Soviet Union, even
[i]f it is assumed that some of the resistance units in Russia or members of the
civilian population did commit acts which were in themselves unlawful under the
rules of war, it would still have to be shown that these acts were not in legitimate
defense against wrongs perpetrated upon them by the invader. Under
international law, as in domestic law, there can be no reprisal against reprisal.
The assassin who is being repulsed by his intended victim may not slay him and
then, in turn, plead self-defense.
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAwNo. 10 VOL. IV 493-94 (Oct. 1946 - Apr. 1949).
147. Kattan, supra note 57.
148. Livni Briefing in Sderot, supra note 133.
149. U.N. Charter art. 51.
150. This requirement comports with the common-sense proposition that one must be responding to
the acts of another, acts which must be of a certain gravity, if one's actions are to qualify as self-
defense. Id.
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harm that the invoking state has suffered.1 5 1
We believe that Israel's claim of self-defense fails on at least four grounds.
First, we doubt that self-defense can be properly invoked by an occupier vis-A-vis a
territory that it has previously occupied. Second, Israel did not suffer an "armed
attack"-at least, not one that it had not provoked itself-in the months prior to its
invocation of the right of self-defense. Third, Israel could have preserved the
rightful security of its citizens through means other than force-by negotiating an
extension of the truce-and thus the exercise of force was not necessary. Fourth,
even assuming that all of the foregoing were not true, the scale of Israel's attack
vastly exceeded the scope of a permissible exercise of self-defense. We will
examine each argument individually.
A. "Self-defense" within an occupied territory?
The International Court of Justice has cast serious doubt on Israel's ability to
invoke a claim of self-defense against attacks emanating from Gaza. As noted
above, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Israel is entitled to act in
self-defense in response to armed attacks. 152 In its 2004 Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory decision,
however, the ICJ stated that Article 51 of the UN Charter "recognizes the existence
of an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed attack by one State against
another State."153 Noting that Israel "does not claim that the attacks against it are
imputable to a foreign state," the Court concluded that attacks launched from the
West Bank do not give rise to an Israeli right of self-defense. 154 The Wall decision
did not address attacks launched from Gaza, but the reasoning of the Court applies
with equal force to the Strip, which like the West Bank, is a non-state entity.
As Victor Kattan has observed: "[N]ot all defensive measures are measures
taken in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is because self-
defense is an exculpatory plea regarding resort to force in the first place, and not
for an offense taken during an armed conflict.",15 In other words, Israel is
employing a jus ad bellum (justifications for going to war) principle in a jus ad
bello (principles governing the conduct of war) context-citing a ground for
initiating conflict for its behavior in what is, legally and in fact, a continuing
conflict. This does not mean that Israel, in principle, cannot use force to suppress
violence emanating from either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, or act to protect
its own civilian population. But as a matter of law, it must do this as an exercise of
151. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW: TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM
THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/
taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
152. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 51. See
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9).
153. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9).
154. Id.
155. Kattan, supra note 57.
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its right to police the occupied territories, and not as an exercise of the right of self-
defense.
B. The "Armed Attack" requirement
We have already described the sequence of events leading to the breakdown
of the truce, and have suggested that Hamas rocket fire, which followed Israel's
November 4 raid, cannot be cited by Israel as having triggered its right of self-
defense. No state can launch an attack, and then point to the retaliation for that
attack as the trigger for a claim of self-defense-unless, for example, the retaliation
involved a significant escalation of violence over the initial attack. Here it should
be pointed out that the Hamas rocket fire between Israel's lethal November 4 raid
and its far more lethal invasion on December 27 had caused no Israeli deaths. 15 6 It
does not seem reasonable that Hamas' response to Israeli-initiated violence (which
continued after November 4 as well) was an escalation at all, at least judged by its
results.
Yet can Israel cite the rocket fire it suffered prior to the truce as the "armed
attack" justifying its use of force?1 57 We do not believe so. It does not comport
with the understanding of self-defense as a limited exception to the general
obligation that states resolve their disputes peacefully that a state be permitted to
"nurse" or "store" a claim of self-defense-then invoke it at a later time at its
convenience. 158 The more logical position is that a claim of self-defense, if not
exercised within a reasonable period of time, lapses. In this case, southern Israel
had enjoyed virtually complete calm for five months, before Israel's own acts
precipitated the breakdown of the truce and the resumption of rocket fire by Hamas
in November 2008.
It is further significant that during the pre-truce period, Israel's hands were
not clean. As noted above, Israel had instituted an illegal blockade against the
Gaza Strip, causing immense suffering to the Palestinian civilian population. 159
Furthermore, it had repeatedly raided and attacked the Gaza Strip, from September
2005 until the launch of Operation Cast Lead killing, as previously stated, 1,250
Palestinians. 160 Israeli violence in no way justified the rocket and mortar fire by
Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, which were indiscriminate, illegal, and
156. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROCKETS FROM GAZA: HARM TO CIVILIANS FROM PALESTINIAN
ARMED GROUPS' ROCKET ATTACKS 10-16 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/
reports/ioptqassam08O9webwcover.pdf.
157. We assume for the sake of argument that the earlier attacks, in the aggregate, were sufficient
to constitute an "armed attack." Yet this conclusion is not ineluctable. Not all uses of force constitute
armed attacks giving rise to a right of self-defense - a limitation designed to deprive states from
exploiting minor border incidents to justify broad-scale attacks. The ICJ has held, for example, that acts
of armed force carried out by "'armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries"' must be "'of such
gravity as to amount to,' inter alia, an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces." Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (citing G.A.
Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 3(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974)).
158. See U.N. Charter art. 5.
159. Letter to Olmert: Stop the Blockade of Gaza, supra note 135.
160. Kattan, supra note 57.
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caused much harm to Israeli civilians. But Israel's incessant attacks on the Gaza
Strip cannot be irrelevant in assessing whether the earlier rocket fire triggered
Israel's right of self-defense. We conclude that it did not.
C. The Necessity Requirement
In order for a claim of self-defense to be valid, the actions taken in
accordance with that claim must be necessary. As the ICJ has stated: "[I]n
customary international law 'whether the response to . . . [an] [armed] attack is
lawful depends upon observance of the criteria of the necessity and the
proportionality of the measures taken in self-defense."' 16 1 Even if it is assumed that
the rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip are sufficient to constitute an
armed attack, Operation Cast Lead was not necessary and thus cannot be justified
as a legitimate act of self-defense.
Most importantly, however, Israel had an alternative to violence in its quest to
stop rocket fire from the Gaza Strip; namely, to renegotiate the truce that had
brought the greatest calm to its southern residents in six years. This option
remained open even after the lapse of the formal truce on December 19, as Hamas
leaders offered to consider renewing the truce as long as Israel lifted its blockade
of the Gaza Strip.162
Israeli Foreign Minister Livni stated before Operation Cast Lead began that a
prolonged truce with Hamas "harms the Israeli strategic goal, empowers Hamas,
and gives the impression that Israel recognizes the movement." 163 In short, Israel
chose violence not because it was necessary, but because the peaceful alternative
of negotiations bore a political cost that Israel was unwilling to pay: enhanced
legitimacy for Hamas.
D. The Proportionality Requirement
Military action undertaken in self-defense must be limited in scope, or
"proportional", to the harm to be redressed. A state purportedly acting in self-
defense uses only such force as is necessary to repel the attack against it or to
reestablish the status quo ante.164 Thus, "[a]cts done in self-defense must not
exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them."1 65 In this context, had
Israel suffered an unprovoked "armed attack," the scope of its response would be
limited to targets necessary to stop rocket fire from Gaza-the harm that Israel was
claiming to redress. Attacks on military or civilian targets not tied to rocket fire, on
161. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 174 (Nov. 6) (quoting Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, T 194, (June 27). The question of
proportionality will be taken up in the next sub-section.
162. Hamas 'May Extend' Truce if Israel Ends Siege, Stops Attacks, THE DAILY STAR, Dec. 24,
2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition id=10&categid=2&article id=98679.
163. Finkelstein, supra note 142 (citing Saed Bannoura, Livni Calls For a Large Scale Military
Offensive in Gaza, INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST MEDIA CENTER, Dec. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.imemc.org/article/57960.
164. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 862 (Aspen Law & Business 2002).
165. Id. (quoting Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 138-39 (1986)).
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the other hand, would exceed the scope of legitimate self-defense. In fact,
Operation Cast Lead seemed calculated to achieve objectives considerably beyond
stopping rocket fire from Gaza-a fact reflected both in statements by Israeli
officials, and in Israel's choice of targets during the fighting.
In its decision in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms, the ICJ confirmed that
one aspect of the criteria of necessity and proportionality "is the nature of the
target of the force used avowedly in self-defense."166
Israel's choice of targets during Operation Cast Lead was incompatible with a
proper exercise of self-defense. Speaking of the latest invasion of Gaza, Major
Avital Liebowitz of the IDF Spokesperson's Office stated: "Anything affiliated
with Hamas is a legitimate target." 167 "We are hitting not only terrorists and
launchers," Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Dan Harel explained,
"but also the whole Hamas government and all its wings."1 68 "After this operation
there will not be one Hamas building left standing in Gaza."1 69
Israel has claimed that at least some of these targets harbored fighters or
military supplies, but the statements above seem more consistent with an intent to
disable if not destroy Hamas's capacity to govern.170 Moreover, the record of death
and destruction-detailed below1 7 1_is consistent with these pronouncements by
Israeli spokespeople. Thus, even if all the other requirements of a valid exercise of
the right of self-defense were present-and they were not-Israel's attack on the
Gaza Strip thus appears to have exceeded the scope of a valid exercise of that right.
V. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
There are only two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force in
international affairs-military action taken with the approval of the UN Security
Council and the use of force in self-defense. 172 The Security Council did not
authorize Israel's latest military campaign against the Gaza Strip, and as
demonstrated above, Operation Cast Lead does not qualify as self-defense.
166. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 74, 76. In that case, the Court rejected the assertion of the US
that its attacks on certain Iranian oil platforms constituted self-defense because there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of Iranian military presence on the platforms. The Court also rejected the
US' claim of self-defense because there was no evidence to prove that the United States made any
complaints to Iran about the alleged military use of the Iranian platforms.
167. Finkelstein, supra note 142 (citing B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: B'TSELEM TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL MAZUZ: CONCERN OVER ISRAEL TARGETING CIVILIAN OBJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP (Dec. 31,
2008)), available at http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza Strip/20081231 Gaza Letter to Mazuz.
asp.
168. Tova Dadon, Deputy Chief of Staff Worst Still Ahead, YNETNEWS.COM, Dec. 28, 2008,
available at http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3646462,00.html.
169. Id.
170. B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: B'TSELEM TO ATTORNEY GENERAL MAZUZ: CONCERN OVER
ISRAEL TARGETING CIVILIAN OBJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP (Dec. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza Strip/20081231_GazaLetter to Mazuz.asp.
171. See infra Section VIII.
172. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 42 & 51.
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Without the authorization of the Security Council or the justification of self-
defense, Israel's invasion of Gaza arguably amounts to aggression. According to
the Nuremberg Tribunal, "[t]o initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."7 3
"War on a major scale causes great suffering and almost invariably involves the
commission of atrocities." 74
There is little question that the scale and character of Israel's attack on Gaza
would be adequate to constitute aggression if it had been committed against
another state. As Antonio Cassese notes, despite some instability in current
definitions of aggression in international criminal law: "Customary international
law appears to consider as international crimes: the planning, or organizing, or
preparing, or participating in the first use of armed force by a state against another
state in contravention of the UN Charter, provided the acts of aggression
concerned have large-scale and serious consequences." 175 Israel's Gaza invasion
was of a massive scale, and clearly brought about extremely serious
consequences.176
But the charge of aggression may be inapposite for two other reasons: first, as
we have shown, Gaza is not a state, and it is not clear that aggression can be
committed against a non-state entity; second, whether or not Gaza is a state, as we
have also shown, it remains under Israeli occupation, and arguably, alleging
aggression-like Israel's claim to self-defense-improperly imports jus ad bellum
principles into a context of an ongoing conflict. In this view, aggression, in
essence, involves the unjustified initiation of war by one state against another state,
not its continuation.
As to the first of these concerns: we believe that customary international law
currently establishes that aggression may be committed against non-state entities
that, like the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, have been designated as "self-
determination units" by the international community. The United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3314, which offers a "Definition of Aggression," states:
"Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations . . ." (italics added). 177 Article
1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations recites as one of the purposes of the
organization: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
173. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 267 (Cambridge University Press 2007).
174. Id.
175. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL Law 114 (Oxford University Press 2003).
The definition of aggression contained in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974, similarly
states: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or
political independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations." G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
176. See infra Section VIII.
177. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
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the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . As UN
General Assembly Resolution 2131 states, all states have a duty to "respect the
right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely
exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms."179 The duty outlined in resolution 2131 is customary
international law.18 0 Furthermore, as General Assembly Resolution 2625 provides,
"Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples . . . of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence."1 8 1
The definition of aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 also
reaffirms "the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their
right to self-determination, freedom and independence ... 182
As the International Court of Justice observed in 2004, the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination is a well-established fact.183 And since at
least the mid-1970s, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination could
be implemented only if, inter alia, "Israel evacuated the Palestinian territory it had
occupied by force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions
... 184 The United Nations General Assembly recognized as early as 1984 that the
West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip were the locus for the
exercise of the Palestinian people's right of self-determination.1 5 The same notion
was unanimously affirmed by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution
endorsing the "Roadmap for Peace."1 8 6 Accordingly, the objection to an allegation
of aggression on the ground of the Gaza Strip's status as a non-state entity is
without merit.
The second concern, that Israel cannot "aggress" against a territory that it
currently occupies, is more weighty. We agree that the crime of aggression
principally implicates jus ad bellum, notjus in bello, principles. Fairly speaking, if
178. U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
179. G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. AIRES/20/131 (Dec. 21, 1965).
180. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, THOMAS M. FRANCK, & DAVID M. MALONE, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 117-18 (Oxford University Press 2008).
181. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
182. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 177, at 143.
183. "As regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court observes that
the existence of a "Palestinian people" is no longer in issue. Such existence has moreover been
recognized by Israel. . ." Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 182 (July 9).
184. U.N. Comm. on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, The Right of
Self-Determination of the Palestinian People, 33, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/3 (Jan. 1, 1979), available
at http://domino.un.org/pdfs/STSGSERF3.pdf.
185. G.A. Res. 39/146, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/146 (Dec. 14, 1984).
186. S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003) (The resolution, by its terms, only
"Reaffirm(ed) its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within
secure and recognized borders," but, in referencing its earlier resolutions, 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973,
made clear that the site of the Palestinian state would be in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)
and the Gaza Strip.).
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the Gaza Strip remains occupied, as we have argued above,1 87 it is logically
consistent to hold that Israel's December-January attack did not constitute
aggression, and instead must be evaluated solely according to jus in bello
standards. Conversely, if for any reason, Israel's invocation of the right to self-
defense is considered timely (although not necessarily valid in all respects), the
only fair conclusion is that it may also have committed aggression against the Gaza
Strip.
We now turn from Israel's justification for launching its attack-failed, in legal
terms, as we have argued-to examine Israel's conduct during the fighting itself.
Here, as well, we find that Israel has committed serious violations of international
law.
VI. TARGETING CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
In the preceding section, it was suggested that Israel had exceeded the scope
of a valid exercise of the right of self-defense because it attacked targets, many of
them civilian, that could not reasonably be linked to the objective of stopping
rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. Yet Israel's attacks on civilian targets also appear
to have violated another independent legal principle: the duty of distinction. These
failures seem to fall into three categories: 1) those stemming from Israel's
definition of all institutions and individuals associated with Hamas as legitimate
military targets-a definition that flies in the face of established international law;
2) those reflecting, perhaps, Israeli troops' employment of overly liberal rules of
engagement; 3) those involving indiscriminate uses of weapons.
A. The Duty ofDistinction
The duty of distinction is perhaps the most basic tenet of international
humanitarian law,"ss and stands for the proposition that "the parties to the conflict
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only
be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed at civilians."l8 9 This
basic rule of war is codified in many international agreements and conventions,
including the 1863 Lieber Code, 1907 Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, as well as the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions.
The United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 2444 of 1969 outlined the
scope of the principle, which affirms "That the right of the parties to a conflict to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch
attacks against the civilian populations as such." 190 The companion rule regarding
targeting objects states that "the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish
between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed
187. See supra Section II.
188. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle ofDiscrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 148 (1999); Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of
Distinction and the Realities of War, 39 INT'L LAW. 733 (2005); Mark David Maxwell & Richard V.
Meyer, The Principle of Distinction: Probing the Limits of its Customariness, 2007 ARMY LAW. 1, 1
(2007).
189. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 3.
190. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII) at 50, U.N., Doc. A/7433 (Dec. 19, 1968).
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against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian
objects." 191 Israel's own Law of War booklet codifies this principle. It states that
"in principle, the IDF accepts and applies the principle of distinction."192
International law contains clear definitions of "armed forces" for the purposes
of armed conflict and maintains that civilians must still be protected. Under
customary international law, "armed forces of a party" include "all organized
armed forces, groups and units, which are under a command responsible to that
party for the conduct of its subordinates." 193 Even when the distinction of armed
forces is less clear, civilians retain their status: "All that can be said is that persons
[civilians] who do not take a direct part in the hostilities of a non-international
armed conflict enjoy protection against attack while persons who take a direct part
in hostilities are liable to lawful attack." 194 Taking direct part in the hostilities must
mean "acts which are intended to cause actual harm to enemy personnel and
materiel . . . supplying food and shelter to combatants, and generally speaking
sympathizing with them, is insufficient reason to deny civilians protections against
attack." 95
International criminal law makes individuals liable for serious violations of
this rule. Violations of the rule of distinction may be in the form of intentional
targeting of civilians and civilian areas as such, or attacks that are indiscriminate in
nature even if their stated targets are not civilian. The Geneva Convention
considers "grave breaches" to include "willful killing, torture or inhumane
treatment,... willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, .
. . and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." 196 Similarly, indiscriminate
attacks in which the attacker was aware of the danger posed to the civilians in the
targeted area are also war crimes under customary international law. 197
B. Israel's attacks on Gaza's civilian infrastructure and private sector
In the twenty-two day assault of the Gaza Strip, Israel struck numerous
civilian targets, among them schools, mosques, the UN headquarters, roads,
bridges, numerous govermment administrative buildings, courts, prisons, forty
police stations, fire houses, harbors, bird farms, and money changers. 198 Despite
191. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL. I: RULES 25 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. 1].
192. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 6.
193. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 14; See also Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3.
194. RED CROSS SYMPOSIUM:PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN 21ST-CENTURY WARFARE 13 (Mireille
Hector and Martine Jellema, eds., Wolf Legal Productions, 2001).
195. Id.
196. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3. See also Customary International
Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 601.
197. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 601.
198. Jonathan Cook, Devastation Has Always Been a Goal for Israel, THE NATIONAL, Jan. 18,
2009, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090118/FOREIGN/573500826/1011/SPORT; see also Ben
White, Israel's Targets in Gaza, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.newstatesman.com/
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explicit protection under international law199, cultural sites came under direct fire,
such as the al-Nasr mosque which was built in 736 C.E.,200 and the Antiquities
Museum of Gaza.201 The Gaza zoo came under attack by Israeli forces, where
many animals were shot at point plank range.202
Israel ravaged the private sector of Gaza as well. A cattle farm was attacked
on January 3, killing twenty-one cattle.203 Palestinian industry has been crippled,
with more than 230 factories destroyed, including whole swaths of industrial zones
where factories produced goods such as cookies, wooden furniture, and ice
cream.204 As one reporter observes, "It's as if a tsunami of fire had roared through
Gaza's industrial district, leaving behind a tide of twisted metal and smashed
buildings."205
Israel claimed that many of these targets either housed weapon caches or were
sites from which Hamas fighters were returning fire on Israeli troops. This may
well have been the case as to some of the targets-although Israel's record of
dubious, if not false, claims regarding its war conduct should be recalled here.206
Yet a number of these targets were hit during the first surprise wave of bombings
on December 27, and thus could not have been struck by Israel in response to
return fire. This was true, for example, of the Gaza City police compound, where
sixty-five police recruits were killed as they attended graduation ceremonies.207
middle-east/2009/01/israel-targets-gaza-hamas.
199. Hague IV, supra note 47, at art. 23(g).
200. Gaza Prayer Turns Deadly as Israel Hits Mosques, AL ARABIYA, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/06/63609.html.
201. Lauren Gelfond Feldinger, First Evidence of Damage to Gaza's Cultural Sites Emerges, THE
ART NEWSPAPER, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=16827.
202. Ashraf Helmi, Israeli Troops Shot and Killed Zoo Animals, GULFNEWS, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://gulfnews.com/region/MiddleEast/10278858.html.
203. Press Release, Al-Mezan, Israeli Forces Bomb Schools and Mosque, THE ELECTRONIC
INTIFADA, Jan. 3, 2009, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/articlel0105.shtml.
204. Tim McGirk, The Devastation of Gaza: From Factories to Ice Cream, TIME, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874539,00.html [hereinafter McGirk].
205. Id.
206. See supra Introduction; see McGirk, supra note 204; see Ben Lynfield, 'My Daughters, Tthey
Killed Them': Doctor Shows Israelis Horror of War, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 19, 2009, at 18, available
at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/my-daughters-they-killed-them-tv-doctor-
shows-israelis-horror-of-war-1419286.html; see The Street Smells of Death, SPIEGEL, Jan. 13, 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,601040-2,00.html; see Elliot D. Woods, Rebuilding
Gaza Beset by Hamas, U.S., Others Refuse to Deal with Rulers, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 22,
2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/22/rebuilding-gaza-beset-
by-hamas/; Ethan Bronner & Sabrina Tavernise, In Shattered Gaza Town, Roots of Seething Split, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world
/middleeast/04gaza.html; see Barak Ravid & Akiva Eldar, UN: IDF Officers Admitted There Was No
Gunfire From Gaza School Which Was Shelled, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages /1054009.html; see Ibrahim Barzak & Christopher Tochia, Israel Shells UN
Headquarters in Gaza, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/01/15/israel-shelles-un-headquar n 158078.html; see Jack Schenker, Chaos in Khoza'a, THE
NATIONAL, Jan.30, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/ article/20090130/REVIEW/158145792/ 1008.
207. Legal Aspects of Israel's Attacks on the Gaza Strip During Operation Cast Lead, AL-HAQ,
Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id-41 1.
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Others, including much of the industrial sector, were destroyed as Israeli troops
withdrew, after Hamas resistance had virtually ended.208 Moreover, the UN Office
of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has affirmed, "[i]n many instances, Israel
provided no explanation for why a civilian building was attacked."209 Amnesty
International has similarly documented several cases of destruction of a house, a
mosque and a school, which had been targeted by Israeli forces for supposedly
housing weapons caches. 210 In each building, Amnesty field workers found no
evidence of "secondary conflagration," which would be expected had weapons
been present, or signs of anything having been removed from the rubble.211 The
attacks, instead, seemed consistent with Israel's avowal to hit any target associated
in any way with Hamas, whether or not that target had a military value, as
evidenced in the pronouncements of Israeli military spokespeople adduced
above.212
The Islamic University of Gaza was one of many educational centers targeted
by Israeli forces, being hit in six separate airstrikes,2 13 destroying both the science
building and the women's college 214. Israeli officials claimed, on the one hand, that
the university housed a weapons research center,215 making it a legitimate military
target. This claim has not been substantiated,216 and Israeli officials have offered
an alternative justification, namely that the university was a cultural icon for
Hamas students and militants. Fox News reported that "senior military and security
experts in Israel say Islamic University is much more than an institution of higher
education. They say that universities historically have been breeding grounds for
radical thought, free speech and protest."2 17 Similarly, an Israeli academic has
208. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conlfict,
Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, 349, 992, 997-1000, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/48 (Sep. 15, 2009) (prepared by Richard Goldstone) [hereinafter Report of the U.N. Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict].
209. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 13, 14.
210. Amnesty International, Livewire, Widespread Destruction of Homes, http://livewire.amnesty.
org/ 2009/01/29/908/?lang=es#more-908 (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Widespread
Destruction ofHomes].
211. Id.
212. See supra Section IV.
213. Neve Gordon & Jeff Halper, Where's the Outrage Now?, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUc., Jan.
9, 2009, available at http://chronicle.com/news/article/5725/opinion-wheres-the-academic-outrage-
over-the-bombing-of-a-university-in-gaza [hereinafter Gordon & Halper].
214. Statement from Association of World Citizens to the Secretary-General of the U.N., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/S-9/NGO/6 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf eed216406b50bf648
5256ce10072f637/eelc2482fec5033e8525753d00702825?OpenDocument.
215. Amos Harel & Avi Issacharoff, IAF Bombs 3 Gaza Government Buildings; Officials: 25
Wounded, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051305.html [hereinafter
Harel & Issacharoff].
216. An Israeli academic points out as well that even if they were, "Weapon development and even
manufacturing have, unfortunately, become major projects at universities worldwide - a fact that does
not justify bombing them." Gordon & Halper, supra note 213.
217. Stephanie L. Freid, Bombing of Islamic University: Strategic Target or War Crime?,
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affirmed that "[v]irtually all the commentators agree that the Islamic University
was attacked, in part, because it is a cultural symbol of Hamas."218 A civilian
object is not rendered a "military objective" because it supports or even teaches
political opinions that the attacking party finds offensive or dangerous.
Government buildings were heavily targeted in the bombing campaign,
including a court building,219 the education and transportation ministries, the
parliament building, and a seven-story building that housed the finance, foreign
and labor ministries.220 Israeli air force officials characterized the office of Hamas
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, which was hit twice, a "terror target;" IDF officials
explained that it was a "government target that also served as a planning, support,
and finance center for terrorist activity."2 2 1 This targeting rationale flies in the face
of the criteria set up by international humanitarian law that limits attacks on dual
purpose buildings as only those that serve a fundamental military function.222
Buildings housing media outlets have also been targeted and damaged by
Israeli attacks. A building housing Iranian al-Alam and Press TV was hit by Israeli
fire, despite assurances from Israeli forces, who are reported to have been aware of
its coordinates, that it would not be attacked, and installing light projectors on the
roof to further identify it.2 23 In an attack that has been recognized as intentional,
Israeli forces also fired on the Al-Johara Tower in Gaza City, which houses over
twenty international news outlets. 224 In an Al-Jazeera interview Israeli Prime
Minister, Ehud Olmert, defended the strike, "saying that communications
equipment in the building could have been used by Hamas."225 The potential for
use of military communications certainly does not qualify a civilian building as a
military objective, and even if the suspicion were strong, the attacking force must
still assume it to be a non-military objective if there is doubt.226
FOXNEWS, Dec. 20, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,474084,00.html.
218. Gordon & Halper, supra note 213.
219. MSNBC.com, Israel Forces Storm Gaza Neighborhood, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
28633969/.
220. Harel & Issacharoff, supra note 215.
221. Id.
222. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
223. Reuters, Iranian State TV Station Says IDF Strike Targeted Its Gaza Offices, HA'ARETZ, Jan.
9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1054228.html.
224. Out of Print, Digital Crossroads- Wake Up America, http://radioactivegavin.wordpress.
conV2009/01/14/digital-crossroads-gaza-wake-up-america/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
225. CPJ.org, Airstrike Hits Media Building in Gaza, http://cpj.org/2009/01/press-under-fire-in-
gaza-again.php.
226. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 48, 52(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9
feel4a77fdcl25641e0052b079 [hereinafter Additional Protocol ] (Only physical objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or
total destruction offers a definite military advantage may be legitimately targeted.); Customary
International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 29-32; see also International Committee of
the Red Cross, Commentary on the First Additional Protocol of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, para. 2002, n. 3 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds.,
1987). "In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes... is being
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C. Hamas as a "terrorist organization"
Israel's position that anything affiliated with Hamas is a valid military target
is not supported by international law. Hamas is an organization that has discrete
military and civilian wings.227 While Israel and a handful of other nations have
designated Hamas a "terrorist organization," this designation has only domestic
legal implications in the countries adopting it. The designation bears no
international legal import, and does nothing to relieve Israel of its obligation to
respect the civilian-combatant and civilian objects-military objectives
distinctions.228 Unless treated by the international community as legally binding
that is, as customary international law-the designation cannot be understood to
transform well-established norms of international law defining "civilians" and
"combatants" and requiring distinction between the two. There is no indication that
the designation of Hamas as a "terrorist organization" has become a binding
principle of international law. On the contrary, the fifty-six member Organization
of the Islamic Conference has adopted a declaration holding that violent resistance
to foreign military occupation or colonization cannot be considered terrorism.22 9
D. Lax rules of engagement
News media also reported attacks on civilian population centers in Gaza that
killed dozens of civilians. These attacks, though not conclusive of war crimes,
suggest intentional targeting of civilians and civilian objects. It is unclear whether
apparently deliberate attacks on Palestinian individuals were the outgrowth of
individual misconduct by Israeli troops, possibly fueled by anti-Palestinian racial
animus, or were the product of lax rules of engagement. There is evidence to
support both inferences.
One of the most severe attacks on a densely populated civilian area happened
in the al-Zeitouna district of Gaza City in early January, where Israeli forces
"reduced the eastern Gaza City suburb to little more than rubble in a matter of
days." 23 0 These attacks were described at the time as "the single bloodiest incident
used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."
227. Some nations, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, recognize this distinction by
designating only Hamas's military wing, the Izz ed-Din al-Qassam brigades, as a "terrorist
organization." See Australian National Security, Listing of Terrorist Organisations,
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB57CA3DECF30CA2
56FABOO1F7FBD?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 26, 2009); see United Kingdom, Office for
Security and Counter Terrorism, Proscribed Terrorist Groups, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/
legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2000/proscribed-groups (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
228. Hamas has been designated a "terrorist organization" by the United States, Israel, Canada,
Japan, and the Council of the European Union (although not by its constituent members). The United
Kingdom and Australia additionally consider the armed wing of Hamas a "terrorist organization." Anita
Rice, War Crimes Convictions After Gaza?, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 23, 2009, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/01/20091229274380583.html; United Kingdom, supra note 227.
229. OIC Convention to Combat Terrorism, Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference on Combatting International Terrorism art. 2, July 1, 1999, available at
http://www.oicun.org/7/38/.
230. Sheera Frenkel, Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2009,
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of the Gaza conflict"231 and UN officials called it "one of the gravest incidents"
yet.232 Graffiti in Hebrew left behind after the troops' withdrawal-"Death to
Arabs," "War on Arabs-Sounds Good to Me," "The Only Good Arab is a Dead
Arab," "I hate Arabs," and one in English "1 is down, 999,999 to go" 233 -further
point to a potentially lethal animus toward the residents as a whole, not just
Hamas, and one that could easily lead to violations of proscriptions against
deliberately targeting civilians.
However, this graffiti and the racist animus behind it may not only be the
work of individual soldiers. Indeed, Israeli troops had been supplied with written
materials from both the army chief rabbinate and from Israeli settler or right wing
organizations that counseled against mercy toward "the cruel." One such writing
advised: "soldiers of Israel to spare your lives and the lives of your friends and not
to show concern for a population that surrounds us and harms us. We call on you. .
. to function according to the law 'kill the one who comes to kill you.' As for the
population, it is not innocent ... We call on you to ignore any strange doctrines
and orders that confuse the logical way of fighting the enemy." 23 4 The latter may
be read as an invitation to contravene international humanitarian law. Thus, it is
hard to ascertain whether the apparently indiscriminate attacks on civilians were
the consequences of individual misconduct, or of official incitement.
Some soldiers admitted to following extremely liberal rules of engagement,
revealing to journalists that their orders were to "fire on anything that moves in al-
Zeitouna."2 35 One soldier reported that, "We were to shoot first and ask questions
later." 236
At least twenty-nine members of the Samouni family were killed by Israeli
forces in al-Zeitouna.237 Family members recounted that a kinsman was killed in
front of his family after raising his hands when Israeli soldiers approached his
home. Israeli soldiers continued to fire on the rest of the family, killing the man's
four-year-old son.238 Other family members explained that 100 members of their
clan were herded by Israeli troops into one building, which later was directly and
repeatedly fired on. Many of the family members died instantly, while others died
over a period of four days while the Israeli forces refused entry of the Red Cross
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle-east/article5601177.ece [hereinafter Israeli
Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders].
231. Tim Butcher, Gaza Medics Describe Horror of Strike Which Killed 70, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 7,
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4162193/Gaza-medics-describe-
horror-of-strike-which-killed-70.html.
232. Israel Maintains Gaza Assault Despite Cease-fire Resolution, THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 10, 2009,
available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition id=10&categid=2&article id=98922.
233. Rod Nordland, The Smell of Death, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/180483 [hereinafter Nordland].
234. Amos Harel, IDF Rabbinate on the War: We Will Show No Mercy on the Cruel, HAARETZ,
Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058758.html.
235. Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, supra note 230.
236. Id.
237. Nordland, supra note 233.
238. Id.
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into the area to evacuate the wounded.239 In all, reports indicate that around
seventy corpses of members of the same clan were pulled from the rubble after the
troops withdrew.240
In yet another attack on a town, this time in southern Gaza, reports indicate
that the village of Khuza'a was attacked by the Israeli army over a period of hours,
during which several women, children, and elderly people were killed. Residents
from the village contacted the Israeli human rights organization B'tselem early in
the attack to report that women had been shot by Israeli forces while waving a
white flag as well as several other residents exiting a house on soldiers' orders.241
Further reports indicate that during the attack, groups of civilians were shot at
indiscriminately after being told by Israeli troops to evacuate, homes and structures
were destroyed indiscriminately sometimes with the residents still inside, and that
several individual civilians were targeted by snipers and shot dead.242
E. Indiscriminate use of weapons
A senior military analyst with Human Rights Watch has condemned the use
of certain weapons as amounting to indiscriminate attacks when directed at dense
population centers.243 Israeli airstrikes against Rafah refugee camp, even when
ostensibly targeting militants, have caused indiscriminate death and destruction to
the surrounding civilian population, including many women and children hit in
239. Jonathan Finer, At a Flash Point in Gaza, A Family's Deadly Ordeal, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Jan. 27, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/26/AR2009012602481.html.; Nordland, supra note 233; Democracy Now,
Part II: Palestinian US College Grad Loses 2 Brothers in Israeli Shooting; Father Watched Son Bleed
to Death After Israeli Troops Blocked Ambulances, (radio broadcast Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/22/part iipalestinian us college grad.
240. Butcher, supra note 231.
241. Press Release, B'tselem, Witness Reports that Israeli Soldiers Shot Woman Waving White
Flag in Gaza Strip (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.btselem.org/English/PressReleases/
20090113.asp; Ashraf Khalil, In Gaza town, A Bitter Aftermath; Witnesses Say White Flags Didn't
Keep Israeli Troops from Firing. The Event Could be Key to any War Crimes Probe, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/mideasternail/la-fg-
gaza-reconstructl5-2009feb15,0,6630449.story (identifying the murdered woman as Rawhiya Najar).
242. Fida Qishta & Peter Beaumont, Israeli Accused of War Crimes Over 12-hour Assault on Gaza
Village, THE OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/18/israel-war-
crimes-gaza-conflict; Jack Sheckner, Chaos in Khoza'a, THE NATIONAL, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090130/REVIEW/158145792/1008.
243. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL: STOP SHELLING IN CROWDED GAZA CITY, Jan. 16, 2009,
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/16/israel-stop-shelling-crowded-gaza-city. ("Firing
155mm shells into the center of Gaza City, whatever the target, will likely cause horrific civilian
casualties," said Marc Garlasco, Senior Military Analyst at Human Rights Watch. "By using this
weapon in such circumstances, Israel is committing indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of
war.") See also Ben Night, Amnesty International Accuses Israel of War Crimes in Gaza, ABC.NET,
Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/01/20/2469609.htm?section=justin; The
Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability, supra note 17
(stating that "Israel's firing of artillery into densely populated civilian areas in Gaza may amount to
indiscriminate attacks.").
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their own homes.2 " Researchers found evidence that Israeli troops had fired 155
millimeter howitzers into heavily populated areas.245 These shells have a margin of
error of thirty meters, and a blast radius of 300 meters.246 According to Fred
Abrahams of Human Rights Watch, Israel's choice of less precise weaponry raises
questions of intent: "When you have an alternative that is GPS-guided and very
accurate, why would you use a shell that is much less accurate and has a much
larger kill radius?"247
F. Legal implications oflsrael's warnings to Palestinian civilians
Israel made use of a variety of kinds of warnings to Palestinian residents of
the Gaza Strip, including leaflets dropped by air, and cell phone messages. 2 48 A
message typically claimed that a particular structure housed weapons and its
destruction was imminent, and any inhabitants should evacuate immediately.249
Israeli troops also employed a technique dubbed "knocking on the roof," whereby
artillery fire would be directed at comers of buildings to serve as a warning to
individuals inside to leave, before more powerful ordnance was aimed at more
vulnerable parts of the structure.250 Israeli military lawyers advised commanders
and troops that any Palestinian civilians who failed to head these warnings were
acting as "voluntary human shields," and therefore, were partaking in hostilities
and could be legally treated thereafter as "combatants." 251
Did these warnings in any way relax or alter Israel's duty of distinction in
Operation Cast Lead? The probable answer is: "no." In principle, such warnings
would tend to indicate an effort by a warring party to minimize civilian casualties,
and thus, to respect the principle of distinction. The difficulty in actual application,
however, is that civilians in the midst of battle often would not be aware of, or
actually have, safe routes of escape to a place of sanctuary. As a practical matter,
then, if there is no refuge, the warnings would only amplify the suffering of
civilians by adding to their fear and confusion.
244. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL/HAMAS: CIVILIANS MUST NOT BE TARGETS, Dec. 30,
2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/496321bb2c.html; AL MEZAN CENTER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, ISRAELI MASSACRES IN GAZA CONTINUE: 284 KILLED; INCLUDING 32 CHILDREN, AND
755 INJURED; GAZA'S SERVICE SYSTEMS PARALYZED UNDER SEVERE LACK OF MEDICINE, FOOD AND
POWER, Dec. 29, 2008, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EDIS-
7MSLBF?OpenDocument.
245. Ben Hubbard & Alfred de Montesquieu, Rights Groups Says Laws of War violated in Gaza,
THETHEASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2009, http://abcnews.go.conInternational/wireStory?id=6800758.
246. Id
247. Id.
248. Abraham Rabinovich, Israel warning civilians to flee, THE AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 30, 2008, at 7,
available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24853989-15084,00.html.
249. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF issues warnings to the civilians of Gaza, Jan. 7, 2009,
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/IDF warns Gaza
population7-Jan-2009.htm; Report of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note
208.
250. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
251. Id
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In the particular case of Gaza, it should be recalled that Israel fenced the
entire region beginning in 1994,252 and that during the fighting, all exit points from
the Strip were virtually sealed.253 Thus the vast majority of its 1.5 million residents
was unable to flee outside the Strip, and with bombardments occurring throughout
it, had no effective refuge within it. Indeed, the Samouni clan, whose terrible
ordeal was described above, had obeyed orders by Israeli troops to assemble in a
family compound-and then was attacked despite its compliance.254
Apart from the ineffectuality of the warnings, it strikes us as particularly
egregious to argue that mere failure to adhere to an evacuation warning would,
ipso facto, render a civilian a combatant-a notion that rests on a severely twisted
understanding of "voluntariness."
VII. ISRAELI TROOPS AND THE USE OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS As HUMAN
SHIELDS
There is evidence to suggest that Israeli troops in some instances used
Palestinian civilians as human shields. This practice has something in common
with the offenses described in the prior section, in the sense that each unjustifiably
exposes civilians to injury and death. However, the practice is distinct, as it does
not involve the direct and deliberate targeting of civilians by the offending party,
and the practice is also governed by a distinct set of legal principles.
A. International Law Governing the Use ofHuman Shields
The use of human shields is prohibited by international law, and the violation
of the laws and customs prohibiting this practice constitutes a war crime. Common
Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel and Hamas are bound
by customary international law and Israel specifically as a signatory to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, states that "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely." 255 "Violence to life and person" 25 6 and
the "taking of hostages" 25 7 are strictly prohibited against the above mentioned class
of protected persons. Customary international law likewise proscribes the use of
human shields in non-international armed conflict,258 and violation of this norm is
252. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho
Area, Isr.-P.L.0, May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+Area.htm.
253. A small number of injured civilians was permitted to leave. See generally id. at Annex II.
254. Kershner & el-Khodary, supra note 2.
255. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3(1). See also Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians
as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State
Against Terrorism?, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 445, 449-50 (2002).
256. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3(1).
257. Id. at art. 3(1)(b).
258. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 3, 337 (specifically Rule
9, deriving from APII: 13(1) and the prohibition of taking hostages in foreign case law); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
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a war crime recognized under customary international law, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal
Court.259
The use of human shields is generally defined as using the presence of
civilians or civilian objects to render military objects immune from attack;2 60
accordingly, military objectives should be located outside civilian areas and away
from civilian persons to the extent possible.261 The mere presence of military
objects within civilian areas or near protected persons is not dispositive of the use
of human shields.262 Rather, the military objects must have been purposefully
placed within or in close proximity to the civilian persons or objects with the intent
of using this protected class to immunize the military objects from attack.263
B. Israel's Use ofPalestinian Civilians as Human Shields
There is increasing reason to suspect that Israeli forces used Palestinian
civilians as human shields in their ground offensive in Gaza. If so, this would be
consistent with long Israeli practice in the Occupied Territories; the IDF has
repeatedly been brought before the Israeli High Court and its well-documented
uses of human shields have been consistently criticized by that court.264 Human
Rights Watch workers are reporting that consistent with previous practice by the
Israeli army,265 they have documented cases in which Israeli troops have entered
Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(c), Dec. 7. 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16
I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol Il]; Customary Intemaional Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note
191, at 334 (see the customary international law articulated in Rule 96). See also Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome
Statute] (classifying as a war crime the utilization of the presence of civilian or other protected person
to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations).
259. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 599 (Rule 156); Rome
Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
260. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 337 (Rule 97); Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 28; Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 51(7).
261. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 58(b). See also id at art. 44 (recognizing that
circumstances may arise in which combatants will mingle with the civilian population, and requiring
that in such cases they carry their arms openly).
262. Id. at art. 50(3).
263. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 340. See also KNUT
DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 32 (2003) (referencing the Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), and
quoting Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes Regulations, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Sept.
9, 2002), which states that elements of a "[w]ar crime of using protected persons as shields" include:
"(1) [t]he perpetrator moved or otherwise took advantage of the location of one or more civilians or
other persons protected under the international law of armed conflict" and "(2) [t]he perpetrator
intended to shield a military objective from attack or shield, favour or impede military objectives"). See
also Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 344-45 (explaining that the
travaux prdparatories make it clear that the mens rea requirement for the war crime of human shielding
is specific intent).
264. See Israel Bans Use of Human Shields, Oct. 6, 2005, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle east/ 4314898.stm.
265. Chris McGreal, Demands Grow for Gaza War Crimes Investigation, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 13,
2009, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/13/gaza-israel-war-crimes.
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civilian homes and forced the inhabitants to remain on the ground floor while the
rest of the house was used by Israeli military personnel as a base and a snipers'
266
position.
In a report from the ravaged southern Gazan village of Khuza'a, Israeli
snipers allegedly shot at civilians from inside a house, while holding the
Palestinian inhabitants hostage during the assault.267 In one of several reported
individual cases of Israelis practicing clear human shielding tactics, a Palestinian
resident of Jabalya recounted how he was taken from his home at gunpoint by
Israeli forces. He was detained for two days, sometimes in handcuffs, and was
made to accompany military personnel into heavy fighting, as well as used to
approach homes where there were known or suspected Hamas militants inside.268
A similar accusation has been made by another person from the same area, who
explained how he was rounded up with several other young men and forced to
approach homes where Hamas militants were suspected of being, in advance of the
Israeli troop approach.269
These incidents closely track humanitarian law's definition of human shields,
in which there is a clear and knowing use of civilian persons and areas with the
intent of immunizing the Israeli forces from attack or harm.
VIII. DISPROPORTIONATE FORCE
This section examines Israel's disproportionate use of force against
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The proportionality principle is notoriously difficult
to apply in live battle circumstances, and proving violations of the principle is
similarly fraught.27 0 But in the case of Israel's Gaza invasion, Israeli military and
political leaders have repeatedly and explicitly pledged their intention of using
disproportionate force-and then appear to have fulfilled their promises.
266. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Gaza: Military Tactics of Both Sides Endangering Civilians,
Says Amnesty International (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/gaza-
military-tactics-both-sides-endangering-civilians-says-amnesty-inte.
267. Jack Shenker, Chaos in Khoza'a, THE NATION, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/
article/20090130/REVIEW/158145792/1008.
268. Donald Macintyre, My Terror as a Human Shield: The Story of Majdi Abed Rabbo, THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 30, 2009, at 30, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/my-terror-as-a-human-shield-the-story-of-majdi-abed-rabbo-1520420.html
269. Israel Accused of Using 'Human Shields' in Gaza, AL-JAZEERA, Feb. 8, 2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/02/2009291423652274.html.
270. See LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES AND PHILLIPE SANDS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 275-77 (1999). See also Karma Nabulsi:
Crimes of War A-Z Guide, Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/jus-ad-
bellum.html. The analysis of proportionality as ajus in hello principle overlaps, but is distinct from, the
analysis of the proportionality requirement associated with the right of self-defense. First, the jus in
bello version of proportionality is binding on both parties to a conflict. Id. Second, there is a difference
in what proportionality of an attack is measured against. Id. In the self-defense context, proportionality
of force is measured against the harm to which the state is responding. Id. In the jus in bello context,
the proportionality of force measures against the expected cost to civilian lives against the anticipated
military advantage to be gained. Id.
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A. The Principle ofProportionality
The proportionality requirement can appear confusing and paradoxical. On
the one hand, it functions as a an exception to the principle of distinction, in that
proportionality recognizes that the legitimate use of force may sometimes
knowingly target civilian areas, as long as the military advantage conferred from
such an attack is greater than the harm to the civilians. On the other hand, the
principle of proportionality is often misunderstood to require that there be
equivalent damage caused to both sides for the hostilities to have been lawful. In
fact, the principle of proportionality merely dictates that any harm caused as a
result of the use of force cannot be disproportionate to the military advantage of
the act. Simply put, "the costs of war must not outweigh the benefits."271
The proportionality principle has been codified in international conventions,
such as the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,272 and is accepted as
a part of customary international law. 273 As a restraint on the use of force, it applies
throughout a conflict, both when a nation goes to war under presumably justifiable
circumstances (i.e. in situations of self-defense), jus ad bellum, and in the way a
war is conducted, regardless of the reasons for entering into the armed conflict, jus
in bello.274 Under customary international law, the principle of proportionality
states that "launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated, is prohibited."275
International criminal law imposes criminal liability on actors who violate the
principle. Customary international law explains, "launching ... an attack that in
the knowledge that it will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or
damage" constitutes a war crime as a violation of the principle of
proportionality.276 A similar criminal statute exists with the International Criminal
271. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391,
391 n. 1(1993).
272. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 51(5)(b) prohibited to launch "an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."
273. See Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 46, 58 (Rules 14 and
18); William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 539, 544 (1997); JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 62 (1985).). A spokesperson for the Executive Branch of the United States has
also endorsed proportionality as part of customary law: Gardam, supra note 271, at 408.
274. See Gardam, supra note 271, at 404-5 and n.3. The general principle of proportionality thus
applies more broadly than the requirement of proportionality attached to the right of self-defense (see
supra Section IV(4)). The measurement of proportionality also differs: for the general principle, the use
of force is delimited by the military advantage to be gained; in the context of self-defense, the use of
force is delimited by the nature of the harm to be redressed by the state that has suffered an "armed
attack."
275. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 46.
276. Id. at 568-60 (Rule 156).
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Court. 277
B. Measuring proportionality
"The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied." 2 78 Because intentionally
targeting civilians or civilian objects as such is prohibited under humanitarian law,
proportionality tends to focus instead on 1) what military objectives are, 2) what
"military advantage" means and what its boundaries are, and 3) how to balance this
against "incidental" harm to civilians.279
The definition of military objectives is guided by two requirements: (1) that
the proposed target "by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military actions;" 280 and (2) that the "total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive
military advantage."281
For the purpose of the first criterion, customary international law considers
legitimate military objectives to be combatants,2 82  civilians taking direct
participation in hostilities, 283 as well as physical objects that comport with the
above described general description. Because there may be ambiguity related to
the classification of buildings and other physical structures, which are generally
civilian in nature as military objectives may be, Additional Protocol I specifically
limited subjective interpretations, erring on the side of classifying such objects as
civilian. The pertinent article states, "[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is
normally dedicated to civilian purposes . . . is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."284
The more subjective second prong of the military objective definition guides
the degree and nature of the military response necessary in relation to the
objective. This clause indicates that even when an object is identified as a military
objective, the means with which it is attacked and the hoped for outcome are not
277. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(iv) ("war crimes" include "[i]ntentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects. . . .")
278. Fenrick, supra note 273, at 545.
279. See id.
280. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 52(2).
281. Id
282. See id. at art. 43; Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 3, 11
(Rules 1 and 3); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 632, para.
2002, n. 3 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
283. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 51(3); Customary International Humanitarian
Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 19 (Rule 6).
284. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 52(3). In the recent history of significant armed
conflicts, this restriction appears to have been respected both in Serbia and Iraq, despite the presence of
voluntary human shields. Rewi Lyall, Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and
the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States, 9 Melb. J. Int'l L. 313, section IV(B)(2008),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/MelbJIL/2008/1 1.html.
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unlimited,285 but rather must be tailored to the needs and exigencies "ruling at the
time." Furthermore, the requirement that the attack on the contemplated objective
give a "definite military advantage" means that "it is not legitimate to launch an
attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages."286
Additional Protocol I requires that the military advantage be "concrete and
direct," 28 7 indicating that military advantage should be evaluated with respect to
discrete battlefield decisions. The travaux preparatoires of Additional Protocol I
interpreted "concrete and direct" to mean "substantial and relatively close" and
went on to state, "advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would
only appear in the long term should be disregarded."288 Although some
interpretations of military advantage posit that it need not focus on individual
"tactical gains" but can instead be seen as comprising the sum of military actions
in the "full context of a war strategy," 28 9 this perspective is far from being widely
accepted, and appears to contradict the plain language of the Additional Protocol
as well as the intentions of the drafters.
"Incidental" harm to civilians and civilian objects-the counter balance to
military advantage-poses a similar question as to whether harm should be
measured in terms of the immediate impact or the potential long-term effects of the
military action. While there is no definitive rule on this issue, the growing concern
and awareness of the long term effects of certain military actions on the civilian
population, especially those which harm the environment and basic civilian
infrastructures necessary for survival (e.g. water purifying plants, sewage
treatment, etc.), lends support to the position that "planners must consider the long-
term, indirect effects on a civilian population," 2 9 0 instead of a myopic immediate
harm analysis. The only limit of this position is that a military strategist's liability
rests on a determination of being "a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information
available to him or her."2 9 1
285. See INTERNATIONAL COMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 282, at 625, para. 1979.
286. Id. at 636, para. 2024.
287. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 51(5)(b).
288. William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable Legal Standards for
Combat Activities, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 124 (2007).
289. Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons under
International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, 101 (2000), (citing Air & Space Law, in THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 27-29 (Richard M. Whitaker, ed. & Scott R. Morris, rev. edit ed., 1997). This latter
perspective, however, does not appear to be strongly supported by international law. The travaux
preparatoires of Additional Protocol I interpreted "concrete and direct" to mean "substantial and
relatively close" and went on to state, "advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would
only appear in the long term should be disregarded. . . ." Fenrick, supra note 288, at 124.
290. MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR
OPERATIONS 21 n.4 (2000), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph reports/
MR1175/MR1175 .chap2.pdf, cited in Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as
Indiscriminate Weapons under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, n. 62 (2000).
291. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, 1 58 (Dec. 5, 2003). See
also Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 331.
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C. Israel's use of disproportionate force
Because of the proportionality principle's vague formulation of military
advantage, it creates a "lack of precision [which] operates in the interest of military
rather than that of civilians."292 However, in the assaults on Gaza, Israeli military
and political officials have frequently made explicit statements that in fact they
knowingly and purposely authorized disproportionate use of force, elevating it to
the level of military doctrine.
Months in advance of Operation Cast Lead, Gabriel Siboni, an Israeli army
colonel stated:
[C]hallenges [of Gaza] can be overcome by adopting the principle of a
disproportionate strike against the enemy's weak points as a primary
war effort, and operations to disable the enemy's missile launching
capabilities as a secondary war effort. With an outbreak of hostilities,
the IDF will need to act immediately, decisively, and with force that is
disproportionate to the enemy's actions and the threat it poses. Such a
response aims at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an
extent that will demand long and expensive reconstruction processes.
The strike must be carried out as quickly as possible, and must prioritize
damaging assets over seeking out each and every launcher.293
This was dubbed the "Dahiya doctrine," referring to the Beirut suburb
flattened during Israel's offensive in Lebanon in 2006, an attack which Human
Rights Watch concluded was "both indiscriminate and disproportionate." 29 4 Israeli
Army Commander Gadi Eisenkot explained the doctrine in an October 2008
interview concerning possible future conflict in Gaza:
What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in
every village from which Israel is fired on . . . We will apply
disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction
there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are
military bases ... This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it
has been approved.295 (italics added)
Statements by Israeli leaders during the twenty-two day assault on the Gaza
Strip were consistent with the "Dahiya doctrine." Israeli Prime Minister Olmert
during a cabinet meeting in January 2009, vowed that there "will be a
disproportionate Israeli response to the fire on the citizens of Israel and its security
292. Gardam, supra note 271, at 407.
293. Gabriel Siboni, Disproportionate Force: Israel's Concept of Response in Light of the Second
Lebanon War, INSS PUBLICATIONS, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cal-21
&incat-&read=2222.
294. Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Sep. 5, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/05/why-they-died.
295. Joseph Nast, Israel Warns Hezbollah War Would Invite Destruction, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2008,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE4923I020081003.
2009 85
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
forces."296 Foreign Affairs Minister, Tzipi Livni, was quoted as saying that the
offensive, "Operation Cast Lead," had "restored Israel's deterrence ... Hamas now
understands that when you fire on its citizens it responds by going wild-and this is
a good thing."297 Commanding officer in the south of Israel, Yoav Galant, stated
that the IDF intended to "send Gaza decades into the past."298
The military advantage conferred to the Israeli military from many if not most
of the attacks is unclear.29 9 There is serious doubt about whether Hamas' military
capacity was in fact significantly diminished by the Israeli offensive.300 More
pertinent though, is the comparison of the minimal and ineffective resistance301 of
Hamas fighters overall, and the ferocious military might with which it was met. In
this sense, whatever discrete military advantage was gained by these large-scale
attacks was dwarfed by the chaos and bloodshed that it meant for the civilian
population. Amnesty International field workers describe how they "were told that
Palestinian armed groups had fired rockets from nearby open spaces-but it was
hard to see how this could warrant the destruction of entire residential
neighbourhoods," citing specifically to al-Mughraqa where "a quarter of the town
was razed to the ground by Israeli forces." 302 Additionally, the order that the
Givati Shaked battalion received to "fire on anything that moves in Zeitoun,"303 a
neighborhood where dozens of civilians were killed, reveals, at least in some
military operations, a total disregard for balancing the possible military gains
against the harm caused to civilians.
While no armed force is under the obligations to expose themselves to
unnecessary risk of injury, "a willingness to accept some own-side casualties in
order to limit civilian casualties may indicate a greater desire to ensure compliance
296. Rockets hit Israel, Prime Minister Olmert Vows 'Disproportionate' Response, THE
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/ 4420172/=
Rockets-hit-Israel-Prime-Minister-Olmert-vows-disproportionate-response.html.
297. Kim Sengupta & Donald Macintyre, Israeli Cabinet Divided Over Fresh Gaza Surge, THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2009, at 20, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/israeli-cabinet-divided-over-fresh-gaza-surge-1332024.html.
298. Cook, supra note 198, at 2.
299. This is especially true during the ground offensive stage of the conflict, as Israeli officials
admitted that their "target bank" was nearly empty following the weeks of airstrikes. Amos Harel &
Avi Issacharoff, Israel's Aim in Gaza Is to Break Hamas Resistance, HAARETZ, Jan. 4, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1052336.htil; see also Amos Harel, Barak Ravid and Avi
Issacharoff In Response to Gaza Raids, Hamas Threatens to Assassinate Livni, Barak, HAARETZ, Dec.
29, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050681.html; Abraham Rabinovich, Hamas Appeals
for Ceasefire in Gaza, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 2, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.
com.au/story/0,25197,24864396-2703,00.html.
300. Ethan Bronner, Parsing Gains of Gaza War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 18, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/world/middleeast/19assess.html? r-3&hp=&pagewanted=all.
301. Much of the group's manpower remains, mostly because it made a point of fighting at a
distance - or not at all - whenever possible despite the fury of the Israeli advance and bombardment.
Id. Since the start of hostilities, three Israeli civilians have been killed, and ten Israeli soldiers including
three who died from "friendly fire." Id.
302. Widespread Destruction of Homes, supra note 210.
303. Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, supra note 230.
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with the principle of proportionality."304 As one soldier describes, "We knew
everything was booby-trapped, we knew that they would try to kidnap us and if
they did that was the end, we were finished . . . so we took no chances. We
pounded them with fire; they never had a chance."305 Unfortunately, neither did
many Palestinian civilians have a chance.
D. Deterrence and Disproportionality
As we have noted previously, 306one of Israel's apparent goals in launching its
massive attack on the Gaza Strip was to restore its "deterrent capacity." This
position has been summed up by a phrase regularly being used in Israel and among
officials: "the boss has lost it,"3 07 which one commentator describes as "calculated
rage."308 Is this a valid military gain or objective, as some have suggested, that can
be weighed in the proportionality calculus? At least one commentator, noted
military analyst Anthony Cordesman, believes so.3 0 9 We believe not. Terrorizing
1.5 million people so that Hamas, as well as other regional adversaries,3 10 "learns
its lesson" 311 is problematic legally and definitely morally as a "definite military
advantage." It smacks, if anything, as a form of "preventive war," which has failed
to gain broad acceptance as an accepted practice under international law.312
Though there is no requirement under the proportionality rule that damage to
both sides be equivalent, the catastrophic losses suffered by Palestinian civilians,
compared to dubiously classified military objectives and questionable military
advantage Israel received from these attacks, it is fair to conclude that
disproportionate force was clearly used in this conflict.
IX. FAILuRE To RESPECT AND PROTECT MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL
UNITS
Reports emanating from Gaza suggest that Israeli forces violated special
international legal provisions concerning the protection of medical personnel and
units. "Medical personnel" have protected status under customary international
304. Fenrick, supra note 273, at 548.
305. Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, supra note 230.
306. Supra Introduction.
307. Bronner, supra note 300, at 1.
308. Id.
309. See generally ANTHONY CORDESMAN, THE" GAZA WAR": A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS (n. pub.)
67-68, available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza war.pdf.
310. See id. at 27, 31.
311. See ABC News (ABC television broadcast Jan. 4, 2009) (an interview by George
Stephanopoulos with Shimon Peres, President of Israel), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=6573506&page=1: "We don't intend ... to crush Hamas,
but to crush terror. And Hamas needs a real and serious lesson. They are now getting it." See also
Donald Macintyre and Kim Sengupta, Gaza Sliced in Two by Israel's Land Assault, THE INDEPENDENT,
Jan. 5, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gaza-sliced-in-
two-by-israels-land-assault-1225794.html.
312. Brian Angelo Lee, Preventive War, Deterrent Retaliation, and Retrospective
Disproportionality, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REv. 253, 284 (2009).
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law, a designation that is accepted by almost every nation.1 The first paragraph of
Article 20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that "[p]ersons regularly and
solely engaged in the operation of and administration of civilian hospitals,
including the personnel engaged in the search for, removal, and transporting of and
caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm, and maternity cases, shall be
respected and protected." 314 This rule was further articulated in Article 15 of
Additional Protocol I, which states, "civilian medical personnel shall be respected
and protected." 1 The term "medical personnel" is defined in Article 8(c) of
Additional Protocol I.316  The definition recognizes both civilian and military
medical personnel, but limits the designation to individuals who exclusively
perform medical assignments.317 Article 8(c)(ii) mandates that all parties to a
conflict "recognize and authorize" the personnel of aid societies (i.e. the ICRC or
Red Crescent Societies).318
Similarly, "medical units" have protected status under the rules of customary
international law. Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that,
"[c]ivilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm,
and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all
times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict." 319 These provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I are customary
international law binding on all nations.
A. Attacks on medical personnel
There have been numerous reports by the ICRC and other aid and human
rights organizations that allege attacks upon medical personnel in the field.
Amnesty International alleged that medical personnel came under Israeli fire
repeatedly during the twenty-two day assault on the territory. Seven medical rescue
workers were killed and twenty wounded while transporting or attempting to
collect the dead or wounded in Gaza.320
On January 4, 2009, an ambulance arrived fifteen minutes after a missile
strike in Beit Lahiya. A few minutes later, the ambulance was hit with a tank shell
filled with flechettes, which killed one paramedic and seriously injured another.321
313. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International
Humanitarian Law, (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/612?OpenDocument.
314. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 20.
315. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 15.
316. Id. at art. 8(c).
317. Id.
318. Id. at art. 8(c)(ii).
319. This rule is further defined in Article 12(2) of Additional Protocol I, which states that this rule
"shall apply to civilian medical units, provided that they: (a) belong to one of the Parties to the conflict.
. ." or ". . . (b) are recognized and authorized by the competent authority of one of the Parties to the
conflict. . . ." Like medical personnel, the protections include but are not limited to the ICRC and other
recognized aid societies (i.e. PCRS) as well as those belonging to the parties themselves. Id. at art.
12(2).
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On the same day in Gaza City, three paramedics were killed by Israeli missile fire
as they walked through a small field to reach two wounded men nearby.322
Furthermore, ambulance crews could not reach the bodies of these aid workers for
days because they too were coming under Israeli fire as they approached.323 On
January 9, 2009, the ICRC reported that Israeli forces fired directly upon an aid
convoy.324 On January 12, 2009, several ambulances responded to the site of a six-
storey apartment building that had been hit with two missiles. 325 A doctor and
paramedic entered the building to collect the wounded. The doctor was killed when
an Israeli tank shell was fired into the building despite the fact that there were a
number of ambulances and other aid workers downstairs.326
These acts by the Israeli military appear on their face to violate international
legal norms. The consequences of these violations go beyond the danger and harm
to particular aid workers at a point in time. For example, in the days following the
January 9 incident, the ICRC conducted an investigation into the circumstances of
the incident and ordered their workers to remain within Gaza City. As a result, aid
workers could not gain access to wounded people in other areas. When medical
personnel are attacked, the ICRC and other aid organizations are forced to balance
the safety of their employees with their duty to care for the wounded.327
B. Attacks on medical units
During Israel's assault on the Gaza Strip many "medical units" came under
fire, were damaged, and destroyed. Reports from the territory indicate patients and
medical supplies suffered harm that will have both short and long term effects on
the territory.
Reports from the ICRC state that on one particular day, January 15, 2009,
there were four incidents where various "medical units" in the Gaza Strip came
under Israeli fire. There were two separate attacks on the PRCS compound where
the al-Quds hospital is located. In the first attack Israeli forces shelled the
compound and the al-Quds hospital sustained at least one direct hit. This caused a
fire to break out in the hospital, partially damaging the pharmacy.3 28 All of the
patients had to be moved to the ground floor for their safety.329 In a second attack,
the PCRS compound was shelled once again. Seven hundred people had to be
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Gaza: The Challenge of Reaching
Civilians in Need, Audio Interviews with Antoine Grand, the Head of the ICRC's Sub-Delegation in
Gaza and Said Shaath, a Palestinian ICRC Employee, (Jan. 11, 2009) [hereinafter ICRC audio
transcript] (audio transcript available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-
interview-i 10109!OpenDocument).
325. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 320.
326. Id.
327. ICRC audio transcript, supra note 324.
328. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Wounded at Risk as Al-Quds
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evacuated from the compound, one hundred of them patients at the al-Quds
hospital who had to be moved to Shifa hospital.330 In the third incident on that
same day, one of the two PRCS warehouses in Gaza was shelled and set ablaze,
causing damage to relief items inside.331 In a fourth incident, an UNRWA
compound was hit by Israeli forces.332 These reports again suggest severe breaches
of international law and warrant further investigation.
X. FAILURES TO ALLOW FOR THE SEARCH, COLLECTION, EVACUATION, AND
TREATMENT OF THE DEAD AND WOUNDED
International Law mandates that parties to a conflict must take all possible
measures to collect and evacuate the dead and the wounded and allow for
necessary medical care to those persons. Article 13 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention states that this duty applies to the whole population, military and
civilians alike. 3 3 Article 16 states that the wounded "shall be the object of
particular protection and respect," and that each party to a conflict must "facilitate
the steps taken to search for the killed and wounded."3 34 Article 17 to Additional
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 specifies that the parties may appeal
to organizations, i.e. ICRC and PRCS, to collect the wounded. 3 5 Similarly,
customary international law mandates that parties to an armed conflict search for
and collect the dead.3 36 These rules have been accepted into the law and practice of
nations through treaties as well as domestic law and military procedure.
Reports from the territory describe a number of incidents where these rules
were violated by Israel in its twenty-two day assault on Gaza. The number and the
severity of the violations have led al-Haq to question whether there has been an
Israeli policy of denying medical care arbitrarily.337 ICRC reports state that
coordinating with Israeli forces to gain access to wounded people was generally
difficult during this period.338 On January 7, 2009, Israel announced that there
would be a three hour cessation of hostilities each day to allow medics to get to
wounded people. 339 In response, the ICRC made a statement that this action was
not sufficient and aid workers needed to be able to assist people at all times, not
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humanitarian corridors will in no way alter the fact that civilians living outside
them must also have access to humanitarian aid and medical care at all times." 341
One incident that suggests a glaring violation of international law relating to
the treatment of wounded people is in the ICRC report on the events that transpired
in the by now familiar al-Zeitouna neighborhood January 3-7, 2009. On January 3,
Palestinian families were taking shelter in the homes on that block on orders from
the Israeli military.342 That day, the neighborhood came under heavy shelling,
causing severe damage to persons and property. ICRC workers arrived to render
aid to those in need; however, the IDF refused to grant permission until January 7,
which resulted in worsened conditions and deaths of injured people. On that day,
limited access was allowed to medical aid workers. However, access to some
homes was denied. The IDF refused to remove dirt barriers preventing ambulances
from entering the area. Aid workers were forced to enter and search the area on
foot and were only able to evacuate people using a donkey cart.343
On January 6, 2009, in another incident, the UNRWA shelter for displaced
people in Jabaliya was attacked and forty-three people were killed and many others
injured.344 In addition to UNRWA efforts being affected, an ICRC employee
expressed concern over the attack, "we too had referred families who were seeking
safety to this particular shelter," he stated, "this is a very serious incident which
shows that people cannot be sure of finding safety anywhere right now."345
Another example of Israeli forces denying medical aid to wounded people
comes from the story on the Shurrab family on January 16, 2009.346 That day, a
father and two of his sons came under Israeli gunfire upon exiting their jeep fifty
meters from their home and all three were shot. One son died immediately. The
second son and his father were both badly injured. The soldiers who shot the
family stood by and continued to threaten the men if they moved or used the
phone. Eventually, however, the father was able to reach ICRC and a number of
NGOs by phone. These aid organizations attempted to arrange to render aid to the
family but Israeli forces denied clearance to the relief agencies for nearly 24 hours,
during which time the second son died as well (from the worsening of his injury,
two bullet wounds to the leg).3 47
eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/palestine-israel-news-080109?opendocument.
341. Operational Update, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Gaza: Access to
the Wounded Remains Top Priority (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng
/siteeng0.nsf/html/ palestine-update-060109.
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343. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), supra note 338.
344. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), supra note 341.
345. Id.
346. Democracy Now!: Part II: Palestinian US College Grad Loses 2 Brothers in Israeli Shooting;
Father Watched Son Bleed to Death After Israeli Troops Blocked Ambulances, (PBS television
broadcast Jan. 22, 2009) (video and transcript available at http://www.democracynow.org/
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347. Id.
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The actions of Israeli forces alleged in these reports indicate that there may
have been serious violations of international law. The firing upon medical
personnel and medical units, discussed above, makes the collection of and care of
the wounded difficult. Another violation comes from the failure to grant access to
the wounded once medical workers respond to a call for help or a massive attack.
XI. ILLEGAL USES OF WEAPONS
As stated above, attacking civilians with any weapon is categorically
prohibited under international law. Furthermore, with certain weapons that are
indiscriminate in nature or particularly dangerous to human life, international law
mandates that they only be used where there is no alternative and extra care is
taken to protect civilians from harm. Weapons that cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering are prohibited. Reports from the Gaza Strip during Israel's
assault suggest illegal uses of weapons in densely populated civilian areas and
against civilian targets. Other reports allege the use of deadly precision weapons
directly against civilian targets. These actions seem in direct violation of
international legal norms and must be investigated further.
A. Restrictions on the uses ofweapons
International legal principles governing the use of weapons have developed
with the goals of reducing the unnecessary suffering of all people in armed
conflicts and avoiding any unnecessary harm to civilians. Article 35(2) of
Additional Protocol I states, "it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles, and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering." 348 Adherence to this rule of customary international law is
the purpose of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). 349 The CCW consists of the
umbrella treaty and five annexed protocols. The convention itself is written in
general terms to prohibit weapons that are indiscriminate or cause unnecessary
suffering.350 Israel is a party to this convention.351
Article 2 of Protocol III to the CCW states that incendiary weapons may not
be used against civilians or civilian objects.352 Furthermore, it prohibits the use of
incendiary weapons against military targets located within a concentration of
civilians by method of air delivery or any other method, except when the military
objective is clearly separated from civilians and civilian objects. 353 Of 110 parties
to the CCW, 104 have signed on to Protocol III; however, Israel is not a
348. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 35(2),.
349. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 1523, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter CCWJ.
350. U.N. Office of Geneva, The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C 1257180004BlB30?Open
Document#Top (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
351. CCW, supra note 349.
352. Id. at Protocol III, art. 2.
353. Id.
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signatory.354 Despite its decision not to sign on to Protocol III, Israel has chosen to
incorporate some of its internationally accepted legal restrictions on the use on
incendiary weapons.
B. Israel's use of White Phosphorous
White Phosphorous (WP) is a toxic chemical that is dispersed in artillery
shells, bombs, and rockets.3 55 A WP shell contains over 100 felt filaments that
ignite on contact with air, drift to the ground and continue to bum.356 Burning WP
creates thick, white smoke.357 It may be used legally as a smoke screen to hide
troop movements. However, the explosion of a WP shell results in the
indiscriminate scattering of fragments,358 so it may not be used against human
beings or in densely populated areas where there is danger that people will be
injured by it.3 59 This is because WP sparks fires that are difficult to extinguish and
causes very severe bums to human tissue (WP can bum flesh away to the bone, as
it does not stop burning upon contact with the skin).360
On January 21, 2009, the Israeli government admitted that its troops might
have used white prosperous in contravention of international law, despite the fact
that it was claimed up until that point that it was only used for legal purposes. 361
According to senior IDF officers quoted in Ha'aretz, there are two types of
phosphorus munitions that were used in Gaza. The first, are 155mm shells that
contained trace amounts of phosphorus. The second are 88mm and 120mm
standard phosphorus shells that are fired from mortars.362
An internal military inquiry will take place surrounding an incident that
occurred on January 17, 2009 when an Israeli paratroop brigade allegedly fired
twenty standard WP shells in a heavily built up area around Beit Lahiya, including
a UN school.3 63 Israel claims that this could have been caused by a failure of the
GPS that guides the mortars, however, this is the same justification put forth in
3642006 for similar incidences in Gaza. This incident is one of many that allege the
use of WP in civilian areas. This, and all others, require further investigation to
determine if these munitions were used in contravention of international law.
354. Id
355. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, AL-JAZEERA, Jan. 19, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.
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356. Nicholas Blanford & Robert Marquand, Gaza: Israel Under Fire for Alleged White
Phosphorous Use, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.
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Many reports of white phosphorous use in civilian areas come from witnesses
who were present when the munitions were fired. Marc Garlasco, senior military
analyst for Human Rights Watch reported watching WP munitions exploding over
the Jabaliya refugee camp, one of the most crowded areas in Gaza, over the five-
day period between January 9 and 14, 2009.365 Other reports indicate that on
January 15, 2009, three shells containing WP hit a UN compound in Gaza city,366
and on the same day, the al-Quds hospital in Gaza city was hit by a WP shell.367
Other reports come from those who have witnessed the aftermath of the
attacks. While working in the territory during this period, Amnesty International
(AI) delegates found indisputable evidence of widespread use of WP in densely
populated areas in northern Gaza. Christopher Cobb-Smith, weapons expert for Al,
toured the area on January 19, 2009, with a four-person delegation. 3 68 They
discovered streets and alleyways littered with still-burning wedges of WP and the
remnants of the WP shells and canisters fired by the Israeli army. 369 Donatella
Rovera, Al researcher, says that the use of WP in civilian areas in Gaza is
undeniable. She reported that on January 20, 2009 there were still WP wedges
burning all over Gaza, specifically at the UN school and compound.370
Additionally, doctors in the territory have been reporting serious bum injuries
that they say are likely caused by VP munitions. These bums tend to deteriorate
over time, requiring skin grafts even though none would have been required based
on the initial presentation.371 WP bums may also cause liver and kidney problems.
Doctors are reporting that treating these injuries is difficult because it is difficult to
distinguish WP bums at first, and most doctors have never witnessed WP bums
before. 372 These factors make treating WP bums very difficult and increase the
risk of long-term harm or death of victims. Concern over this led Amnesty
International to call on the Israeli authorities to "disclose the weapons and
munitions used during the fighting in Gaza, citing that they, 'now know that white
phosphorous munitions were used in built-up civilian areas.' It was highlighted
that this information is critical so that doctors can, 'be fully informed so that they
can provide life-saving care."'
373
The allegations of WP shells being fired at civilian targets indicate that there
may have been serious breaches of international law by Israeli forces in the Gaza
Strip. Reports from the territory, discussed above, show overwhelming evidence
365. Blanford & Marquand, supra note 356, at 7.
366. Beaumont, supra note 357.
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ISRAEL'S INVASION OF GAZA IN INT'L LAW
that these munitions were either used against civilian targets, or that they were
used without significant precaution, resulting in severe injury to civilians and
civilian objects. Furthermore, the types of injuries linked to WP use raise questions
about use of weapons that inflict superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering in
contravention of international law. These allegations warrant further investigation
as to whether or not international law was violated.
C. Israel's use offlechettes
Flechettes are 4cm-long metal darts that are pointed at the front and have four
fins at the rear.3 74 5000-8000 are packed into 120mm shells that are generally fired
out of tanks.375 When fired, the darts scatter over an area 300M wide by 100M
376beiv tlong. Experts believe they should never be used in built up civilian areas
because this is an anti-personnel weapon designed to penetrate dense vegetation.377
The use of flechette shells is not expressly prohibited by international law.378
However, as they are indiscriminate in nature, many consider their use restricted in
a densely populated area like Gaza.379 B'Tselem has recorded that flechettes were
used in both Gaza and Lebanon numerous times in the past.3 80 At present, there are
several reports alleging the use of flechettes in Gaza by Israeli forces during the
twenty-two day assault on the territory. One incident involving the use of
flechettes is mentioned above, in which an ambulance was hit with a tank shell
filled with flechettes, killing one paramedic and seriously injuring another.381 On
January 5, 2009, several flechette shells were fired on the main road in the town of
'Izbat Beit Hanoun.382 Two civilians were killed and several others were injured.383
On January 7, 2009, a flechette shell struck a home in the village of al-Mughraqua
killing a father and his two children. 384 At this time, there is strong evidence that
these indiscriminate weapons were used in populated civilian areas, constituting a
severe breach of international law. The international community should take action
to further investigate the use of flechettes in Gaza.
D. Allegations concerning Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME) and other
experimental weapons
Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME, also known as zamma or
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"mosquito" 385) are dispersed by shells that expel "a blade of charged tungsten dust
that bums and destroys everything within a four-meter radius."386 The pressure
wave created by the detonation of a DIME device moves from the ground up,
causing the amputation of the lower limbs and abdomen.387 The U.S. Air Force
developed DIME devices as precision weapons. They are designed for use in urban
areas because the explosions they create are highly lethal, but have a very limited
range of explosive force. 88 DIME devices contain radioactive materials that have
long-term effects on victims, including cancer.389
DIME devices are not an officially licensed weapons as they are still
experimental; therefore, they are not covered under any specific provisions of
international law that refer to specific weapons. 390 The use of DIME is governed
by international law that governs the use of weapons in general. These legal norms,
discussed above, state that the targeting of civilians is a violation of international
law as is the failure to take special care to limit harm to civilians and civilian
objects. Furthermore, as discussed above, it is a violation of international law to
use weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
Due to the nature of DIME devices as precision weapons, the incidences of
civilian casualties resulting from their use are alarming. Dr. Erik Fosse, a
Norwegian doctor working in the Al-Shifa hospital in northern Gaza, reports that
most of the patients he saw with injuries thought to be caused by these devices
were children.3 91 This indicates that the devices must have been detonated within
four meters of these children. 392
The use of DIME is somewhat difficult to detect; however, doctors working
in Gaza have learned that it is an indication that DIME devices are being used
where both legs are lost in an attack as opposed to one.393 Dr. Jan Brommundt of
Medecins du Monde noted greater incidences of these types of injuries in Khan
Younis during Israel's assault on the territory.39 Dr. Fosse noted a significant
increase in the number of double amputations at al-Shifa hospital as well.395 He
suspected DIME devices because of the nature of the amputations and the large
amounts of flesh tom off of the lower bodies of victims. 396 Dr. Mads Glibert, a
Norwegian specialist working at al-Shifa hospital, also reported that the injuries he
had seen were consistent with DIME. He stated that the wounds from this weapon
are distinctive. It results in severed or melted limbs and internal abdominal
385. Interview by Rose Mishaan with Shabbir Wadee, M.D., in Gaza City, Gaza (Feb. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter Shabbir Wadee interview] (on file with author).
386. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supra note 355.
387. Id.
388. Blanford & Marquand, supra note 356, at 7.
389. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supra note 355.
390. Cook, supra note 378.
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ruptures. No shrapnel is found on the body; only a dusting of metal particles
becomes visible upon autopsy. Similar injuries were witnessed when Israel
attacked Gaza in 2006, possibly caused by a prototype weapon similar to DIME.397
Other reports allege uses of new or experimental weapons based on never-
before-seen injuries witnessed by doctors working in the Gaza Strip. Miri
Weingarten, spokesperson for Physicians for Human Rights, stated that physicians
suspect that Israel has been using a new weapon akin to DIME called kalanit
(anemone), which is a shell that shoots out hundreds of discs.3 98 Doctors have
reported removing these discs from patients' bodies and have noted that they cause
both bilateral and unilateral amputations and irregular cuts.3 99
Dr. Jan Brommundt, a German doctor working in Khan Younis, recently dealt
with never before seen abdominal injuries resulting from Israeli attacks on Gaza.
She explained that some patients presented with a slight pain that deteriorated to
"acute abdomen," like appendicitis, within one to five hours.400 When doctors tried
to perform an operation, they discovered dozens of lxi millimeter or 1x2
millimeter particles in the patient's organs.4 0 1 This type of injury cannot be treated
and most patients die from multi-organ failure and septicemia within twenty-four
hours.402 These injuries are most likely caused by an explosive shell that disperses
small particles that penetrate all of the bodies' internal organs. 403
In addition to reports of new and experimental munitions use in Gaza,
allegations of uranium use have surfaced as well. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has opened an investigation into the use of depleted uranium in
munitions used in Gaza.404 This type of uranium is added to weapons because it
allows them to penetrate armor more easily; however, dust left behind at blast sites
may be linked to cancer.405 Inquiry by a British newspaper found elevated levels of
radiation at Israeli missile craters.406
Suspicions surrounding the use of DIME and other experimental weapons in
Gaza, as well as allegations that depleted uranium weapons were used, demand
further investigation. The international community must exercise diligence in
determining precisely what these weapons are and why they were selected by
Israel for use in Gaza. First, it is important to know how these weapons function to
determine if they were properly selected for use on certain targets and to explain
the large number of civilian casualties resulting from them. Second, it is important
397. Cook, supra note 378.
398. Id.
399. Shabbir Wadee interview, supra note 385.
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to determine their short and long-term effects, so that victims may be treated, if
they can be treated at all. Details in the reports thus far indicate that Israel may
have violated multiple provisions of international law by using these weapons,
including the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, using weapons that cause
superfluous harm or unnecessary suffering, using weapons that are indiscriminate
in nature, and failing to allow for the medical attention to the wounded required by
their condition.
XII. THE BOTTOM LINE: ISRAEL'S TOLL OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION
The toll on the civilian population of Israel's apparently indiscriminate and
disproportional assault on the Gaza Strip has been nothing short of catastrophic.
UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon has described the aftermath of the attacks on
Gaza as "shocking and alarming. These are heartbreaking scenes."407 Antoine
Grand, head of the ICRC office in Gaza, described Gaza residents as "if they were
waking from a nightmare." 408 In a joint statement prepared by Under-Secretary-
General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes and UN Special Coordinator for
the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry, the UN officials stated that "[t]he
mission was struck by the scale and urgency of the needs of the people of Gaza,
and the heavy and multi-faceted impact that this conflict has had on the civilian
population." 409 And the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator described that "it is
shocking that civilians suffered so disproportionately in this military operation."410
As of February 5, 2009, there are 1,440 Palestinians dead, 431 of them
children and 114 women.411 The number of injured Gazans is at 5,380, 1,872 of
whom are children, and 800 women.412 These figures do not include people who
died due to lack of access to regular health care,413 or the injuries and death of the
approximately 3,700 women who went into labor during the hostilities.414 The
number of dead, however, may continue to rise as family members report deaths,
and people unaccounted for are dug out of the rubble.415
407. UN to Embark on Humanitarian Assessment in Post-Conflict Gaza, UN NEWS CENTRE, Jan.
21, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=29612&Cr-gaza&Crl.
408. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Massive Devastation Calls for Vast
Humanitarian Effort (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-update-
200109?OpenDocument.
409. Senior UN Officials Survey 'Shocking' Aftermath of Israeli Offensive in Gaza, UN NEWS
CENTRE, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=29630&Cr=gaza&Crl.
410. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), supra note 373.
411. Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Field
Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator (Jan. 27-29, 2009),
http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisis/admin/output/files/ocha optgaza humanitarian situation report 2
009 01 29 english.pdf.
412. Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Field
Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator (Feb. 3-5, 2009), http://www.ochaopt.org/
gazacrisis/admin/output/files/ocha optgaza humanitarian situation report 2009 02 05 english.pdf.
413. Id.
414. Press Release, U.N. Population Fund, Restoring Reproductive Health Services and Addressing
Post-Traumatic Stress in Gaza Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=1248.
415. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), supra note 410.
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The health situation is dire; pre-conflict health care was already deficient due
to the closures, and the massive amounts of injured and traumatized Gazans are left
with even fewer resources. The World Health Organization reports that "15 of
Gaza's 27 hospitals suffered damage, 9 [Ministry of Health] and 6 NGO hospitals,
among them Al-Wafa rehabilitation hospital, which is Gaza's only rehabilitation
hospital."4 16 Primary care clinics have also been subject to massive destruction.417
The agency UNFPA, in addition to rehabilitating and restoring health units and
launching a mental health initiative aimed at women and young people coping with
the aftermath of the war, must also reconstruct the "key primary care clinics and
five hospitals that were damaged in the incursion."418
Access to potable water has been greatly diminished. One-fifth of the
population lacks direct access to drinking water, 419 and though UNICEF has been
delivering water purification tablets, they only have enough for a fraction of the
Gaza population. 420 The Sheikh Ajleen sewage treatment plant, which processed
sewage for about 400,000 people, was severely damaged after being hit by Israeli
fire during the hostilities, causing raw sewage to pour into rivers, residential areas,
and the Mediterranean Sea,42 1 and posing serious health risks.422 UNICEF
estimates the damage to the water sector at $3.5 million.423
The full extent of damage to residential buildings is still unknown, but ICRC
will be providing bedding and other household supplies to around 80,000
people.424 ICRC delegate J6rome Giraud reports that "[t]he level of destruction is
absolutely overwhelming . . . Most people have not been able to move back to
their houses. Many checked on their homes, but then decided to return to the
UNRWA shelters. They had no other choice."425
With seven schools completely destroyed, dozens more damaged, and
significant losses of materials, classrooms are taking two to three shifts a day to
accommodate as many students as possible.426 Upon return to her school one
416. Press Release, World Health Org., Health Action in Crisis: Health Situation in Gaza (Feb. 4,
2009), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/wbgs/sitreps/gaza_4feb2009/en/index.html.
417. Id.
418. U.N. Population Fund, supra note 414.
419. Press Release, Relief Web, Gaza: Emergency Aid Alone is not Enough (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EDIS-7NJNSD?OpenDocument.
420. UN to Embark on Humanitarian Assessment in Post-Conflict Gaza, supra note 407.
421. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, TV News Footage: Emergency Aid Alone
Cannot Rebuild Gaza (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-israel-
tvnews-230109.
422. Id.; Relief Web, supra note 419.
423. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), supra note 373.
424. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Massive Devastation Calls for Vast
Humanitarian Effort (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/palestine-update-
200109?OpenDocument.
425. Id.
426. Press Release, UNICEF, Back to School in Gaza, Children Welcome Chance to Resume
Normal Lives (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt 47592.html; McGirk, supra
note 204.
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student remarked, "I was shocked from the scenes that I saw-classrooms damaged,
windows broken, every comer in the school reminds us of the war."427
As a whole, Gaza's infrastructure and industrial sector have been devastated.
In Northern Gaza, households are receiving around six hours of power a day.428
Gaza's factory row was almost entirely wiped out in the bombings, and the UN
estimates total damages at $1.5 billion.429  "Getting this infrastructure up and
running will require the unrestricted and constant flow of building materials and
other necessary items into the territory," explained Antoine Grand, head of the
ICRC office in Gaza.430
OCHA has announced that "only $63 million of the $117 million needed for
priority projects in Gaza has been committed or pledged so far."431 Though
humanitarian and financial help may be more forthcoming as the magnitude of the
damage becomes more widely known, Israel's unrestrained punishment of Gazan
civilian infrastructure may have served as a deterrent not only to its enemies, but
also as a deterrent to donors, who may be asking themselves, as Norway's Foreign
Minister put it, "[s]hall we give once more for the construction of something which
is being destroyed?" 43 2
XIII. HAMAs AND ALLEGATIONS OF WAR CRIMES
While Israel has a special duty to the people of the effectively occupied
territory of Gaza under the laws of belligerent occupation,433 this does not release
Hamas from responsibility for its conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict.
Specifically, Hamas fighters may be held liable for war crimes for deliberately
targeting civilians and civilian objects, or employing weapons indiscriminately.
However, Israeli allegations that Hamas has employed Palestinian civilians as
"human shields" have not been substantiated.
As detailed above, the principle of distinction is one of the cornerstones of
International Humanitarian Law, the prohibition on purposefully targeting civilian
persons and objects being codified in every humanitarian legal instrument, court or
tribunal mandate, and universally accepted to be part of customary international
law.434 While civilians are not immune from attack, according to the principle of
proportionality and military advantage, they are never to be the object of an attack.
This principle is just as binding on non-state actors as it is on nation states.435
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428. Relief Web, supra note 419.
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Since the start of hostilities, Hamas fighters have continued to fire missiles
aimed at civilian areas in southern Israel.436 Furthermore, on many occasions,
Hamas has stated that its aim is to target and terrorize the civilian population.43 7
These acts, regardless of the actual damage inflicted,438 appear in serious breach439
of the laws and customs of war, and Hamas fighters could be held liable for a
variety of war crimes." 0
Military actions by Hamas against Israeli military objectives, 441 however, do
not constitute war crimes unless such military objectives are targeted along with
442civilian ones in an indiscriminate manner, or the military advantage gained by
attacking Israeli military objects is outweighed by the harm caused to civilians.
The placement of military objectives close to or within civilian areas on the part of
the Israeli military443 raises questions about whether some of the damage in parts
of southern Israel, 444 on which Hamas rockets landed, are considered unlawful
indiscriminate attacks.44
ENFORCEMENT 246 (2007).
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The Israeli government has alleged that Hamas fighters have committed war
crimes by using Palestinian civilians as "human shields."" 6 This accusation has
been used both as an indictment of Hamas's conduct during the ongoing hostilities,
as well as a defense for the high numbers of Palestinian civilian casualties and
civilian structural damage caused by the Israeli military assault." 7 However, the
use of Palestinian civilians and civilian objects as human shields by Hamas fighters
in the current conflict has been largely unsubstantiated and in some cases openly
refuted and disproven.
In order to establish that Hamas fighters are in fact using civilian areas and
persons as shields, it must be shown that Hamas militants' intent is to use those
areas or protected persons in order to immunize themselves from attack.448 As a
Human Rights Watch report explains, "[i]ndividuals responsible for shielding can
be prosecuted for war crimes; failing to fully minimize harm to civilians is not
considered a violation prosecutable as a war crime. To constitute shielding, there
needs to be a specific intent to use civilians to deter an attack."4 49 While this
differentiation may seem more technical than moral or practical, the intent element
of the crime of human shielding is crucial; otherwise, any armed force that was
backed into a civilian area because of the flow of battle would be rendered
impotent to defend itself militarily under humanitarian law.
Many reported incidents of Hamas fighters using human shields do not
provide enough information about the incidents to be at all conclusive about
possible "human shielding." Most of the reports lack firsthand accounts of whether
or not civilians were present during incidents in which Hamas fighters were
located in civilian areas due to the complete ban of allowing journalists into the
Gaza Strip until weeks into the conflict. 450 Furthermore, there are tens of thousands
thought legitimately to be aimed at military objectives, would be considered indiscriminate because of
the lack of precision of the weapons used. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra
note 191, at 3, 25, 40-41 (Rules 1, 7, 12(b)); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3.
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that the travaux prdparatories make it clear that the mens rea requirement for the war crime of human
shielding is specific intent).
449. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING THE
2006 WAR VI(D) (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/05/why-they-died. See also
Lyall, supra note 284, at 316 (explaining that "liability does not attach to a breach of art. 58 amounting
to a failure by a defending state to fulfill its responsibility to take adequate precautions to remove and
protect civilians from attack.").




ISRAEL'S INVASION OF GAZA IN INT'L LAW
of Gazan residents who have been displaced from their homes because of Israeli
bombings and attacks,451 indicating that many civilian areas have been emptied of
their residents perhaps before Hamas fighters arrived. In assessing Hamas's
culpability, due attention must also be paid to the possibility that Hamas fighters
had been forced to retreat into densely populated areas in the face of an onslaught
from an overwhelmingly superior military force, merely in order to survive.452
A party to an armed conflict where the adversary employs the tactic of human
shielding is still bound by the fundamental humanitarian principle of distinction,
which specifies that civilians and non-military objectives may never be the
intended targets of military actions.453 Statements made by Israeli officials, such
as Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni who stated, "we cannot avoid completely
any kind of civilian casualties. But the responsibility for this lies on Hamas'
shoulders,"454 demonstrates a lack of understanding that liability for violations of
the principle of discrimination cannot be transferred to the other party even if
human shields are used.
Further investigation of Hamas's battlefield practices is no doubt due. But the
evidence that Hamas fighters exploited Palestinian civilians as human shields is, at
this point, scant. Rather, the accusation seems more likely a part of Israel's
calculated "spin" operation 45 5 that attempts to shift responsibility for civilian
deaths from Israel to Hamas.
XIV. LIABILITY AND THE END OF ISRAELI IMPUNITY
A. State Liability
Israel, under international law, is liable for its violations of its international
legal obligations. Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions (AP I) provides that "[a] Party to the conflict which violates the
provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be
liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by
451. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Field Update on Gaza from the
Humanitarian Coordinator, supra note 412.
452. Israeli forces Surround Gaza City, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, http://www.irishtimes.com/
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israeli-troops-push-deeper-gaza-; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
Situation Report from the Humanitarian Coordinator, Jan. 5, 2009 ("Israeli ground forces are currently
deployed around the large Palestinian population centres in the northern Gaza Strip (Gaza City, Beit
Hanoun, Beit Lahiya, and the Jabalia Refugee Camp), eastern Gaza Strip, between the Gaza
governorate and Middle Area, and in southeast Rafah."); Israeli Forces, Tanks Advance Bisecting Gaza,
CBSNEWS, Jan. 4, 2009, http://cbs5.com/national/israel.hamas.strikes.2.899569.html.
453. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66 at art. 3; Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art.
13(2); Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at arts. 48, 51(4), 50(3), 51(8); Hague IV, supra note 47,
at art. 23(g); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at
78-79 (July 8); Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 3, 17, 37, 40
(Rules 1, 5, 11, 12(a) and (c)).
454. Israel Shatters Key Hamas Targets, supra note 447.
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persons forming part of its armed forces."456
Rules 149, 150 and 158 of ICRC study on customary international law (ICRC
study) provide for the customary rules for state responsibility.457 Rule 149 provides
that:
[a] State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law
attributable to it, including: (a) violations committed by its organs,
including its armed forces; (b) violations committed by persons or
entities it empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority;
(c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its
instructions, or under its direction or control; and (d) violations
committed by private persons or groups which it acknowledges and
adopts as its own conduct. 458
Rule 150 provides that responsible states are required to make reparations for
loss or injury caused.459 Finally, Rule 158 imposes a duty to investigate and
prosecute war crimes committed by their own nationals or armed forces, or those
that occurred upon their territory.460
Further, Israel, in the Adolf Eichmann case, has recognized and affirmed the
principle of state responsibility. In Eichmann, the Israeli High Court stated that "it
is true that under international law Germany bears responsibility for all the crimes
that were committed as its own acts of State, including the crimes attributed to the
accused." 46 1 This recognition is made again in the Report on the Practice of Israel,
which states that Israel acknowledges and supports the view that states bear a
responsibility under international law, for all violations of the laws of war
perpetrated by them or by individuals under their responsibility.462
In the present situation, these rules of customary international law impose
upon Israel: (1) responsibility for actions taken by its officials and the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF); (2) a duty to make reparations for any injury or loss caused
to Gazans; and (3) a duty to investigate and prosecute any war crimes perpetrated
by its officials and IDF officers both in Israel and, as the occupying power, in
Gaza.
B. Individual Criminal Liability
Beyond state responsibility, under international criminal law, individuals can
be held accountable for actions taken which violate certain principles of
international humanitarian law and international human rights. Nuremberg
Principle One states that "[a]ny person who commits an act which constitutes a
456. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 91.
457. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 530, 537, 607 (Rules
149, 150, 158).
458. Id. at 530 (Rule 149).
459. Id. at 537 (Rule 150).
460. Id. at 607 (Rule 158).
461. State of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jer. 1968).
462. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 6.
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crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment."463
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg affirmed this principle where it
proclaimed that "individuals can be punished for violations of international law.
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities,
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced." 464
Under these norms, individual liability has been firmly established for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Further, liability can incur not only
for actual commission of a war crime, but also for "attempting to commit a war
crime, as well as for assisting in, facilitating, aiding or abetting the commission of
a war crime . . . [and] for planning or instigating the commission of a war
,,461crime.
Rules 151 - 155 of the ICRC study provide the customary rules for individual
criminal liability.466 The same rules apply regardless of whether the crimes alleged
were perpetrated during an international or non-international armed conflict. The
rules provide for individual criminal liability for any war crime committed (Rule
151), command responsibility for crimes perpetrated pursuant to their orders (Rule
152), command responsibility for failure to prevent or punish with knowledge of a
war crime (Rule 153), and subordinate responsibility, where there is knowledge
that an act would be unlawful, regardless of the presence of a superior order (Rule
155).467 These rules are substantially the same as the basis for individual criminal
liability found in Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute),468 which is commonly accepted as a codification of
customary international criminal law at the time of enactment. 69 Thus, crimes
against humanity and war crimes, as defined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome
Statute, also form customary international law.470 In the present situation, Israeli
officials and IDF members could be charged with individual criminal liability for
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity for the operation in
Gaza.471
463. U.N. International Law Commission, Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Niremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle 1, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%/o20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.
464. U.N. International Military Tribunal, Judgment: Law of the Charter, Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, (1951), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
465. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 554.
466. Id. at 551, 556, 558, 563, 565 (Rules 151, 152, 153, 154, 155).
467. Id.
468. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 25.
469. ROBERT CRYER, ET. AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 126 (2007).
470. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 24-25.
471. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Time for Accountability in Gaza and Southern Israel (Jan. 26,
2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-for-action/time-accountability-gaza-and-southern-israel.
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The elements of crimes against humanity require that the act in question be
committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population with knowledge of the attack ... " Further, crimes against
humanity do not require a situation of armed conflict.473 During the recent attack
on Gaza, Israeli officials and IDF members could be held accountable for crimes
against humanity for, among others, collective punishment 474 and unlawful killing
of civilians 475 as discussed in section 7(1)(h), section 7(1)(a), and 7(1)(b).
War crimes include violations that are considered to be "[g]rave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions" 476 and those that constitute "[o]ther serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict . . . The crimes
that appear to be most relevant for the present circumstances include, among
others: (1) willful killing;478 (2) extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;479 (3) intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population not
taking part in hostilities or civilian objects; 480 (4) attacks against humanitarian
personnel and installations; 48 1 (5) attacks on buildings dedicated to religion or
education, hospitals, buildings, medical units or personnel using the emblems of
the Geneva Conventions; 48 2 (6) destruction or seizure of enemy property not for
military necessity;48 3 (7) employing weapons or materials and methods of warfare
which can cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or weapons which are
inherently indiscriminate; 48 4 (8) utilizing human shield;485and (9) employing
intentional starvation by deprivation of objects indispensable for survival or willful
impeding of relief supplies. 48 6 The substance of these alleged crimes are discussed
in detail in previous sections.
C. Ending Israeli Impunity: Venues for "Prosecution"
The recent events in Gaza have sparked an outcry in the international
community for criminal accountability for Israeli military and political leaders.487
Navanethem Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated to the
472. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 7.
473. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 5.
474. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 7(1)(h).
475. Id. at art. 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b)
476. Id. at art. 8(2)(a).
477. Id. at art. 8(2)(b).
478. Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(i).
479. Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
480. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(i), (ii), & (iv).
481. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iii).
482. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ix), & (xxiv).
483. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xiii).
484. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
485. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
486. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
487. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 471; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Israel/Gaza: International
Investigation Essential (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/27/israelgaza-
intemational-investigation-essential.
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special session of the Human Rights Council on the situation in Gaza488 that:
[a]ccountability must be ensured for violations of international law. As a
first step, credible, independent, and transparent investigations must be
carried out to identify violations and establish responsibilities. Equally
crucial is upholding the right of victims to reparation. I remind this
Council that violations of international humanitarian law may constitute
war crimes for which individual criminal responsibility may be
invoked.489
The Security Council, in Resolution 1674, reaffirmed the principle that the
elimination of a culture of impunity is important both to prevent future abuses and
make reparations for past abuses and violation:
... ending impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering
from conflict is to come to terms with past abuses committed against
civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses,
draws attention to the full range of justice and reconciliation
mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and
"mixed" criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation
commissions, and notes that such mechanisms can promote not only
individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also peace, truth,
reconciliation and the rights of the victims.490
In order to bring an end to the impunity generally afforded Israeli security and
defense forces, it is paramount to hold both the Israeli state and its individual
actors responsible for their international human rights law and international
humanitarian law violations for their recent operation in Gaza.
D. Special Tribunal pursuant to Security Council Chapter 7 powers
In the last sixteen years, the Security Council has exercised its Chapter 7
powers four times to create or assist with the creation of a special tribunal in an
attempt to give form and effect to international criminal justice. These actions have
resulted in the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 491 The
Security Council could, if it chose, establish a tribunal to investigate and try
alleged war crimes in the Gaza invasion.
488. Press Release, U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Statement of Ms. Navanethem Pillay,
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Ninth Special Session of the Human
Rights Council on The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Including the Recent Aggression of the Occupied Gaza Strip, (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.unhchr.ch/
huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/D78B7DAC697D3060C1257539003B5F3A?opendocument.
489. Id.
490. S.C. Res. 1674, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
491. See S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. S/REs/827, (May, 25, 1993); S.C. Res 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955, (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757, (May 30, 2007); S.C. Res 1315,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315, (Aug. 14, 2000).
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Yet any non-procedural decision taken by the Security Council will be subject
to the Article 27(3) veto power granted to the permanent members of the
Council.492 The United States, which has a long history of using its veto power on
Security Council resolutions related to Israel,493 would necessarily have to approve
of the creation of such a tribunal, which, given the past record seems unlikely.
Perhaps the recent change of administration in the United States will move towards
a change in U.S. policy in this area, but the new administration has made no
statement to indicate movement towards such a change.494
In requesting that the Secretary-General negotiate with the Government of
Sierra Leone, the Security Council recognized that "a credible system of justice
and accountability for the very serious crimes committed there would end impunity
and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration
and maintenance of peace . . ."495 A similar recognition is needed here in relation
to the Israeli operation in Gaza; the question is whether such a recognition will
ever be made.
E. The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC), while arguably the ideal venue for
prosecutions on individual criminal liability, likely lacks jurisdiction over the
crimes committed in the present situation. Israel, as a non-signatory to the Rome
Statute,496 falls outside the general jurisdiction of the ICC, and as such, the ICC has
limited power to investigate and prosecute the possible war crimes perpetrated by
Israel from December 27, 2008 through the declaration of a ceasefire on January
18, 2009. This could only happen in three possible ways, all of which are unlikely
to result in actual ICC investigations and prosecutions.
First, Israel could ratify the Rome Statute and submit to the jurisdiction of the
ICC. But this in itself is insufficient because the ICC can only prosecute crimes
that occur after ratification of the treaty by the state party. As such, in the situation
where Israel submits to ICC jurisdiction, they would have to make a declaration
under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute accepting jurisdiction over the crimes in
question.497 Further, ratification looks to be unlikely. In June 2002, Israeli Ministry
of Foreign Affairs released their views on the ICC.498 They expressed concerns that
492. U.N. Charter art. 27(3).
493. Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-
and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/subjects-of-un-security-council-vetoes.html (last visited Sept.
14, 2009). See also Barry James, Unlike U.S., France Uses Its Veto Power Sparingly, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/03/news/03iht-veto ed3 .html.
494. Richard Lister, Obama's Strategic Silence on Gaza, BBC NEWS, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7812498.stm,
495. U.N. Indep. Special Court, Council Asks Secretary-General, Sierra Leone To Negotiate
Agreement For Creation OfIndependent Special Court, U.N. Doc. SC/69 10 (Aug. 14, 2000).
496. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute (July 21, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties.
497. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 12.
498. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel and the International Criminal Court
(June 30, 2002), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Israel%/ 20and%/20the
o20lnternational%20Criminal o20Court.
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"the court will be subjected to political pressures and its impartiality will be
compromised." 499 Those concerns were found upon what the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs described to be: (1) a highly selective list of crimes; (2) the method of
judicial appointment, specifically the regional appointment structure which would
likely preclude the appointment of an Israeli judge; (3) the extensive powers of the
Office of the Prosecutor; and (4) a concern that the ICC statute attempted to
rewrite international law, in particular they were troubled by the inclusion of "the
transfer, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies" as a war crime.500 As none of the
provisions that concern Israel have changed since the release of this statement,01
absent a re-evaluation by Israel, ratification does not look likely at this point.
Second, the situation could be referred by the Security Council to the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor for investigation pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome
Statute, which states that "[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes
appears to have been committed is referred to the prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.,, 502 This
situation is analogous to the discussion presented above on the exercise of Security
Council power under Chapter VII to create a special tribunal to investigate and
prosecute the crimes in Gaza. This is unlikely to happen due to a likely U.S. veto
of any attempts to take any actions of the sort.
Third, upon referral by a state to the Office of the Prosecutor, the prosecutor
can institute an investigation to ascertain if the situation falls within the jurisdiction
of the ICC.503 As of this writing, this option is currently being explored by the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor after they received over 210 appeals for investigation from
the Palestinian Authority, individuals and NGOs.504 On January 21, Ali Khashan,
justice minister for the Palestinian Authority, faxed a letter to the court recognizing
the court's jurisdiction over "acts committed in the territory of Palestine since 1
July 2002."'o On February 3, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC chief prosecutor, in a
change from his statement made in mid-January that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the situation,506 announced that the ICC would begin a preliminary analysis of
the allegations of war crimes in Gaza. 07
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 258.
502. Id. at art. 13.
503. Id. at art. 13 and 15.
504. Thijs Bouwknegt, ICC Starts Analysis of Gaza War Crimes Allegations, RADIO NEDERLAND
WERELDOMROEP, Feb. 3, 2009, http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/
region/middleeast/090203-icc-gaza-war-crimes-redirected.
505. Sebastian Rotella, International Court May Look at Recent Gaza Battle, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2009, at 4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/05/world/fg-court-palestinians5.
506. Thijs Bouwknegt, ICC Has No Jurisdiction over Gaza War Crimes Claims, RADIO
NEDERLAND WERELDOMROEP, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.mw.nl/international-justice/article/icc-has-
no-jurisdiction-over-gaza-war-crimes-claims.
507. Bouwknegt, supra note 504.
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The first step in this process will be for Mr. Ocampo and the Office of the
Prosecutor to determine if the Palestinian Authority has the power to recognize the
jurisdiction of the court. This step faces two significant obstacles. First, the ICC
can only investigate cases of a nation that has accepted its jurisdiction, and as of
yet the Palestinian Authority has not been recognized by the international
community as a sovereign state. 08 The Palestinian Authority is claiming that as the
"de facto" state in Gaza, it has the power to recognize ICC jurisdiction.509 Mr.
Kashan, the Palestinian Authority's justice minister stated, "[w]e have the
fundamentals of a state and we have met all conditions required from a state." 1 0
On this matter, Mr. Ocampo stated that "[i]t is the territorial state that has to make
a reference to the court. They are making an argument that the Palestinian
Authority is, in reality, that state."511 Further complicating matters is that after June
2007, the Palestinian Authority no longer holds power in Gaza, which also acts to
cast doubt on their ability to refer the situation to the ICC.512 The ICC, in its
relatively short tenure, has yet to make a decision on such a matter and has
promised careful consideration of the situation and all surrounding factors.513 Mr.
Ocampo has stated that "[e]ach legal area is complicated ... We move when we
are completely sure ... We will consider this carefully and thoroughly." 514
The path to ICC jurisdiction now has an opening due to the Office of the
Prosecutor's recent steps to explore the possibility of bringing the situation in Gaza
to the court. This path though is still fraught with obstacles and due to the lack of
ICC jurisprudence, difficult to predict.
F. Employing Universal Jurisdiction: Prosecution in domestic jurisdictions
Rule 157 of the ICRC study finds a customary rule which grants states the
right to exercise "universal jurisdiction" over war crimes in their domestic
courts. 15 Over twenty nations have enacted legislation permitting the exercise of
jurisdiction in domestic courts for war crimes,516 and many more have enacted
legislation that allows universal jurisdiction of war crimes considered to be "grave
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions. The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction, which is considered to be "a progressive restatement of international
law on the subject of universal jurisdiction," helps provide guidelines to the
application of universal jurisdiction by domestic courts.518 Principle One states that
508. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 11(2); Maev Kennedy and Rory McCarthy, Pope Calls
for 'Sovereign Palestinian Homeland,' THE GUARDIAN, May 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/ 2009/may/13/pope-bethelehem-palestinian-homeland.
509. Bouwknegt, supra note 504.
510. Rotella, supra note 505.
511. ICC looking at ways to prosecute Israeli officers, YNETNEwS, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3665413,00.html.
512. Rotella, supra note 505.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 604 (Rule 157).
516. Id. at 604 n.190-94.
517. Id. at 606-07, n. 206.
518. STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
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". . . universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction."5 19
Israel, in its decision in the Eichmann case has recognized and utilized the
principle of universal jurisdiction.
The abhorrent crimes defined under this Law are not crimes under
Israeli law alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind
and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offenses against the
law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium). Therefore, so far from
international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries with
respect to such crimes, international law is, in the absence of an
international court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of
every country to give effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring the
criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law
is universal. 520
The court then goes on to further set forth their rationale for individual
liability under universal jurisdiction.
It will be recalled that the reference here is to a group of acts committed
by members of the armed forces of the enemy which are contrary to the
"laws and customs of war." These acts are deemed to constitute in
essence international crimes, they involve the violation of the provisions
of customary international law . . . those crimes entail individual
criminal responsibility because they challenge the foundations of
international society and affront the conscience of civilized nations.521
Further, Israeli recognition and fear of the possibility of the exercise of
universal jurisdiction by another domestic court in reaction to the Gaza operation
can be seen in the actions that have been taken by the Israeli government in the
days following the ceasefire. The Israeli cabinet has declared that it would grant
legal aid and support to IDF officers if they face liability for war crimes.522 Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert has been quoted to have said, "[t]he state of Israel will fully
back those who acted on its behalf . .. [t]he soldiers and commanders who were
sent on missions in Gaza must know that they are safe from various tribunals."523
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 -27 (2004).
519. Id. at 21.
520. Shofar FTP Archives, Adolf Eichmann Transcripts, http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/
e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/ftp.py?people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Judgment/Judgment-002 (last
visited Sept. 14, 2009) (emphasis added).
521. Shofar FTP Archives, Adolf Eichmann Transcripts, http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.py?people/e/
eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-07-03 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (emphasis
added).
522. Barak Ravid, Israel to Grant Legal Aid to IDF Troops Accused of Gaza War Crimes,
HAARETz, Jan. 25, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058509.html.
523. Israel to Fight Any War Crimes Charges, CBS NEWS, Jan. 26, 2009,
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In fact, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz stated at the Jerusalem Center for
Ethics conference that "we are preparing for a wave of international lawsuits over
the operation in Gaza."524 Further, IDF officers planning to travel out of the state
have been told to contact the Judge Advocate General's Office before leaving
Israel, 525 and the IDF censor has applied strict restrictions preventing the media
from identifying officers who participated in the Gaza Strip fighting and the
information about them that may be used in legal proceedings against them
abroad.526
These preceding actions taken by Israel illustrate the very real possibility that
another country could "exercise their obligations to conduct prompt, thorough,
independent and impartial criminal investigations"5 27 in the form of universal
jurisdiction.
G. International Court ofJustice Advisory Opinion
Article 65 (1) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute provides for
the ICJ to issue advisory decisions on any legal question by request of the UN
General Assembly, Security Council, or other authorized bodies.528 By design,
advisory decisions are non-binding.529
While an advisory opinion by the ICJ may result in an authoritative view of
the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the Gaza
operation, the utility of such an opinion is questionable. Israel has shown complete
disregard for the ICJ in the past, both by their failure to participate in the
proceedings and by their rejection of the final advisory opinion issued in the
proceedings concerning Israel's "separation" wall in the West Bank.530 This
disregard coupled with the non-binding nature of an advisory opinion casts doubt
upon effectiveness of an ICJ decision to actually end Israel's impunity.
H. International Civil Society and boycotts, divestment, and sanctions
The end of apartheid stands as one of the crowning accomplishments of
the past century, but we would not have succeeded without the help of
international pressure- in particular the divestment movement of the
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/25/world/main4752239.shtml.
524. Aviad Glickman, Mazuz: Israel Bracing for Slew of Lawsuits over Gaza op, YNETNEWS, Jan.
11, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3654464,00.html.
525. Tova Tzimuki, Travel Advisory Issued for Top IDF Officers, YNETNEwS, Jan. 19, 2009,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3658823,00.html.
526. Amos Harel, IDF Censor Bans Naming Officers Involved in Gaza op, HAARETZ, Feb. 3, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057964.html.
527. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 19.
528. U.N. Charter art. 65, para 1.
529. The Interpretation of Peace Treaties (First Phase), Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 71, (Mar. 30)
(stating that court opinions "of an advisory nature . . . [have] no binding force."). See also MOHAMED
SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL
ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 113-14 (2003).
530. GERNOT BIEHLER, PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (2008).
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1980s.531
-Archbishop Desmond Tutu
International civil society "prosecution" can help act where traditional forms
of international criminal prosecution have failed. Archbishop Tutu, recognized
with a Nobel Prize for his non-violent struggle to bring peace to South Africa,53 2 in
recognition of the important role that divestment and boycotts played in bringing
about the end of apartheid has stated that "[e]ventually, institutions pulled the
financial plug and the South African Government thought twice about its
policies."533 He then goes further to recommend a similar movement to end the
occupation of Palestine by Israel. 534 In July 2005, such a campaign was called for
by Palestinian non-govermmental organizations with the stated aim for "people of
conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment
initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid
era." 535
The boycott/divestment/sanctions (BDS) movement offers a powerful model
for those seeking justice in Israel/Palestine today. Israel depends on foreign trade
and is sensitive to international opinion, especially in the West, and therefore is
vulnerable from international civil society. When all other avenues are blocked,
and governments fail their responsibilities, citizens must assume responsibility to
ensure respect for international law.
XV. CONCLUSION
There is prima facie evidence that Israel has committed numerous and grave
violations of international law during its assault on the Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters,
too, appeared to have committed war crimes, although on a far lesser scale than
Israel. Further investigation is due in both cases, and if culpability is, indeed,
corroborated, the state of Israel and individuals on both sides must be held
accountable.
In this article, we prioritized Israeli offenses, for two reasons. First, the human
consequences of Israeli violations of international law during Operation Cast Lead
are multiples greater-taking just one measure, the number of lives claimed-100
times greater.536 We do not have figures for property damage caused by Hamas
rocket and mortar fire, but in light of the estimates of property damage in the Gaza
531. Desmond Tutu, Israel: Time to Divest, THIRD WORLD TRAVELER, Feb. 2003,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.conIsrael/IsraelTimeToDivest.html.
532. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize 1984 (Oct. 5, 1984),
http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/aureates/1984/press.html.
533. Tutu, supra note 531.
534. Id.
535. Naomi Klein, Enough. It's Time for a Boycott, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 10, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/10/naomi-klein-boycott-israel.
536. Widespread Destruction of Homes, supra note 210; Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack
Orders, supra note 230.
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Strip,5 37 the differential in respect of that factor may be even greater.
Second, there is no chance that Hamas rocket fire or its other uses of violence
will alter international humanitarian law in any way. Hamas' illegal acts are
roundly and rightly condemned by the international community. Not so of Israel,
that, as we have seen, has consciously and assiduously tried to push the limits of
the law in manners that serve its short-term, military benefit. This campaign at the
margin, and sometimes beyond the margin, of international legality is dangerous,
both for Israel, and for all nations. A common sense measure of the value of a
principle of international humanitarian law is whether one would countenance its
application to one's own country, or to one's own forces in battle. We do not want
another power "knocking on the roofs" of our civilians, nor warning them to
evacuate a city so as to transform it into a free-fire zone.
Israel's capacity to trample international humanitarian law in its current state
is a function of two factors: its overwhelming military superiority as against any
combination of its neighbors; and the cocoon of impunity in which it has been
enwrapped-largely due to the diplomatic cover provided it by the United States.
The United States government has exercised its veto power in the United Nations
Security Council forty-two times-over half the vetoes it has employed since the
birth of the United Nations-to spare Israel censure for its actions.538 In the recent
fighting in Gaza, a Security Council resolution for a ceasefire was delayed in part
out of concern over a probable U.S. veto, permitting Israel to extend its operation
into several weeks.539 Meanwhile, U.S. President Obama, as a candidate, affirmed
support for a military aid package for Israel of $3 billion per year for ten years.540
It is true, of course, that customary international law is formed by the actual
practice of states. But there is a difference between assent to the practices of a
particular state, and acceptance that its actions were lawful, on the one hand, and
sullen acquiescence to what the majority of the world's nations resent, but are
powerless to resist, on the other hand. The former represents the natural and
healthy evolution of international law, and the latter, the ancient and discredited
principle that "might makes right." The stature of international law as a whole is
jeopardized by one nation operating in open defiance of its strictures. For the sake
of all nations, and most of all, for the good of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples,
Israel's impunity must end.
537. McGirk, supra note 204.
538. See Global Policy Forum, Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/subjects-
of-un-security-council-vetoes.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
539. UN Security Council Fails to Agree over Gaza Ceasefire, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Jan. 4, 2009,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/function/0,,12215 cid 3920320,00.html?maca en-en nr-1893-xml-atom.
540. Obama to Increase Aid to Israel, PRESS TV, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.presstv.ir/detail
.aspx?id= 71409&sectionid=3510203.
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